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INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of ti1e Study 
The first purpose of this research is to investigate the 
relationship of corporate payout ratios to corporate growth and market 
price behavior . ~·: Secondly, as a corollary study, 1anagement attitudes 
toward payout policies with regard to stockholder -management r e lations 
and financial planning are examined . 
I n investigating the relation of payout ratios to corporate 
grO\-lt h and market price in C~1apter3 I and II, an attempt is made to 
ans~-1er several questions ,.,ith respect to the companies under con::;ider-
at ion. For example, are low pay-out ratios clo..;ely as.;oc::.ated ,.,ith 
corpor ate growth? Doe::. the relation of payout to grm-1th and marke t 
price vary between groHth, income , and cyclical companies? Would it be 
possible to estimate the extent of growth or price appreciation from tne 
size of the payout ratio? Do loH payout stocks appreciate at a faster 
rate than higi1 pc.yout stocks? 
In considering these question., , an attempt is made to shov1 
that the size of the dividend in relation to earnings is not ~ighly 
associated with growth. In other v1ords, factors other tt1an the payout 
ratio must be called upon to explain grm-1th . If retained earninLG do 
not cause grm·ltu , and if t he only tangible gain to be der iveci from a 
common stod' investment is in the form of dividend r eturn or capital 
appreciation, it would seem that stockholders r dividend reciuirements 
* Corporate growth as used in this paper , refers to tne per cent increase 
it assets, sales, earned surplus , earninu~, and dividends between 1949 and 
19 .::.& . 
8 . 
should receive the utmost consideration in payout matterd and financial 
plannin0 • Therefore, an atte.npt is made to evoke management attitudes 
~·lith regard to the importance of dividends in stoc':e,lolc.er relations and 
financial planninu. 
In Chapters III and IV, certain questions regarding these 
attitudes are raised. For example, do managements feel a revponsibilit} 
to ;;;tate their dividend policies to the stocknolders? Is t here a dis -
tinction by management as to the interests of the stockholders as 
opposed to the interests of the corporation? V.1hat are the primary con-
siderations in dividend pa)out policies? Are stock dividends con-
sidered by management to be satisfactory substitutes for casi1 in tne 
dividend payout of a corporation? 
There are t"t-70 hypotheses, then, to be considered. The first 
is that tncre is very little association between the level of t he payout 
ratio and the 3rowth of a corporation or tne extent of appreciation of 
its market price . The second hypothesis is that the needs of s tock-
holders arc placed by management in a ~ubordinate position to other 
factors uhich affect dividend policy and financial plannins. 
It should be er.1pnasized, 11ouever, tnat since the companies '1ere 
not selected on the basis of a probability sample, the conclusions that 
are reached snoJlcl not be used to generalize for companies not included 
in this study~ 
:.:>ignificance and Importance of tne Problem 
The interest of the author in payout ratios stems from a gen-
eral interest in investment u1atters . The payout ratio is of particular 
interest due to its close relation '·lith the return on a stock tolder's 
9 . 
investment in common stock . It \vould seem that a better understanding 
of the effects of payout policies on corporate ...,rmvth, market valuation, 
and stockholder-management relations •vould be of value to investors and 
managenent alike. 
The questiot. ot \vhether or not there is a high de ,_,ree of carrel -
ation between payout ratios and corporate growtn or market pric~ behavior 
is of conciderable importance to stockholders, potential investors, and 
security analysts . A high correlation would seem to indicate the pos~i -
bility of estimating the expected performance of a management or a 
couunon stack \·li ti1 a higher degree of acc-1racy . On the ot~lCr ha.nd, a 
low correlation \vould seem to indicate the inadvisability of .,::::.ving tne 
size of the payout ratio more than a nominal \veight in the valuation of 
a co1!llon stock investment . 
Tne subject of the study is significant and important to manage -
ment because of the close relation of the payout ratio to 3tocl~holder-
management relations . It is desirable for any corporation to enjoy 
satisfactory relations \vith its :::;tockholders , but this is particularly 
true for a large corporation manufacturing consumer goods as t~1e stock-
holders themselves may be real or potential customers . An unsatisfactory 
dividend policy might result in a depressed market for the conmon stock, 
which in turn could make future financing difficult and costly . Ti.1e 
beneficial effect of a satisfactory dividend policy on financing and 
stockhol er-management relations is illustrated by the record of the 
1 
Anerican Telephone and Telegrap~1 Company . Furthermore, an unsatis -
factory dividend policy could lead to a proxy contest for control by a 
6 roup of dissatisfied stockholders . With fe't-7 exceptions, aividend 
10. 
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policies have come under attack during proxy contests . 
Previous \.Vork none on the Problem. 
A study of corporate income retention betveen 1915 and 19~3 by 
Sergei Dobrovolsky was published in 1951 . The main objectives of tL1is 
study were to determine if retention of earninGS by corporations had 
followed stable patterns during this period , and to determine the rel -
ation bet,~een internal and external funds in financin5 corpor~te invest -
J 
ment . 
In an article in the Journal of Finance in 19J3 , Oskar 
Harkavay presented the results of his study on the relation betvecn re-
tained earnings and corrunon stock prices . In a correlation aJalysis of 
time series of average, annual dividend- earnings rat ~os , co•nputed from 
the Cm~les All - 3tock Index for 1871 -19J7, and from ;:)tandard and Poor's 
Industrial , R.:.ils , and Composite Indexes 1934 -50, he found a high de_,ree 
of correlation. He also found that while there is a t endency for .;toe, 
prices to vary directly with the payout ratio as of a given point of 
time , over a period of years, companies vli th lower payouts tend to 
Lr 
enjoy greater price appreciation. 
In an article in the Commercial and Financial CLlronicle in 
19~7, O.K . Burrell considered the effect of retained earnings on the 
price -earnings ratios of a sar:1ple of grm~th stocks at a given point of 
time . By arrangin8 the stocks in r,uartiles accor<ling to payout, he 
fo nd that for the s tocks he selected, the low- payout stocks sold at con-
:; 
sistently lo,1er price -earnings rat:i.os than the high-payout stocks . 
Cottle and Uhi tman made a study of corporate earning pm~er and 
market valuation durinb the period from 1935 to 19 S . They found that 
11. 
in botn J,tultiple and partial correlation analysis, the payout r.:J.tio and 
st.:J.bility of earnings were of approximately equal significance in de -
l' 
termining t t1e price- earnings ratios of stocks in their study . 
A paper on the distribution of income between dividend~ , re -
tained earnin..,.>, and taxes \·Jas presented by Profescor John Lintner of 
Harvard University in the American Economic Revie\v in 193 u . A.:; part 
of the stuay, field investigations of t\venty - eight comp.:1nies Here con-
ducted , in \-ll1ich various off i cers in the firms were intervieHe~ . 
Lintner concluded that in the majority of companies studied , the clivi -
c.lend decisions \vere based upon the current net earnings and t he previous 
year ' s dividends . It was also indicated th~t for these cofilpanies at 
least, financial pl.:1nning and capital budgetin:s \lere planned .;o as to 
adhere to the dividend policie3 rat~er tnan the dividend decisions de-
7 
pending on ti.1e finar. cial pl. ... nning of the conpany . 
Hhile eaCll of the above studies is some\<~nat rel .:J. ted to the pur -
pose of this p'lper, there are differences in the obJectives that should 
be noteu . The studies by Harkavay and Burrell were concerned with the 
relation of re~ained earnings to marke t val uat ion only, not to corporate 
gr owth i t self . The Cott l e and tolhi t man study \·las primarily concerned 
\vith makin0 co.nparative analyses of earning pmver and market valuation 
for thirty-three maJOr industries, and only incidentall) concerned .-Iith 
the rela tion between payout ratios and market price . The object've of 
the Dobrovolsky study was to determine the patterns of income retention 
over a period of years, not to deterfiline the relation of retaine d earn-
ings to corporate grouth or 1narket valuation. The focus of the Lintner 
paper \·las on the determinat:::.on of factors that enter into decisions on 
12 . 
dividend changes, \vithout regard to the area of stockholder-relations . 
In none of the other studies was there an atte.npt to investigate 
either tne relation of pa)out ratios to corporate gro\vth , or the impli -
cations of payout ratios \vith regard to stockholder-management relations . 
In this paper, furthermore , the relationships are examined for the three 
classifications of growth, income, and cyclical stocks. Hhcre findings 
of these studies supplement or are different from those of the autnor ' s, 
they are cited in the main body of the text . 
Description of the Data and Methods Used in tt1e Study 
The relation of payout ratios to corporate growth, mar~et price 
behavior, and price -earnings ratios is examined by statistical carrel-
ation analysis . Correlation analysis , \-lhicll is a method of studying 
the relationships between variables , is used because it shm-1s v1het ner 
variables, as a matter of actual experience, have varied together , and 
8 
if so what the relationship has been . 
The iirst cnapter consists of a correlation analysis of samples 
of growth, income , and cyclical compqnies in order to determine the 
relation bet\-leen their payout ratios and corporate gro\·7th as measured by 
the per cent increase in assets, sales , earned surplus , earnings, and 
dividends over the ten- year period from 19Lf9 to 19 .)8 . These particular 
measures of corporate gr mvth are chosen since it appears logical that 
these items should increase in value as an industr~al enterprise expands 
its operations . A period of ten years is selected so that the effects 
on browth of cyclical or chance factors should be leveled off. * 
Lists of the companies in tne samples are found in Tables VI, VII, 
and VI II in the Appendix . 
13 . 
In the second chapter, the same procedure is folloued in order 
to relate the payout ratio to the per cent change in market price of t he 
common stocks in the samples for the same ten-year period. In addition, 
a time series of ten low-payout companies and ten high-payout companies 
has been constructed with the per cent increase in market price as the 
dependent variable . The purpose of the time series , ~.,hich is a se t of 
9 
observations made at different times , is to determine the relative 
market performance of a group of lm'i' -payout common stocks and a group of 
hit..h- payou t stocks . ~·, 
The second chapter also contains a correlation analysis of the 
three samples of stocks in order to determine the relat ion betHeen t l1eir 
payout ratios and the va l uation of their common stocks as measured by 
their price- earnings ratios at a given point of time. The aDalysis is 
made for a period of advancing stock prices as ~-1ell as for a period of 
declining stock prices . 
The statistical data are drawn from samples of tHenty- five 
growth , income, and cyclical stocks . These samples uere not selected 
at random and cannot be construed as necessarily representative of 
grm-1th, income , and cyclical stocks generally. There is a strong like-
lihood of bias in the selection. Therefore, the results of the study 
can only describe the relat i on of payout ratios to the various measures 
of corporate groutt1 and market valuation \-lith respect t o these samples . 
For t he purposes of this paper, grm-1tn stocks may be defined 
si nply as stocks \-1hic11 are purchased primarily for capital gain. Income 
Lists of the lo;-1 -payout and high-payout stocks are found in Tables IX 
and X in the Appendix. 
llr- . 
stocks may be defined as stocks Hhich are purchased for stability of 
earnings and dividend return. Actually, the problem of defining gro"\lth 
stocks and income stocks is circumvented by selecting the companies from 
portfolios of mutual funds that were committed to buying stocks for 0roHtll 
or stability and income . To be eligible for the sai,lples, a 8tock must 
have been included in at least one of these portfolios both in 1949 and 
1958 , the period covered by the study, and be listed on the Neu York 
3tock Exchange . 
The mu tual funds ' portfolios \Jere all found in Investment 
Companies by .lrthur Hiesenberger . The growth stocks '\Jei·e selected from 
the Keystone Custodian Fund, Jeries K- 2, the Institutional Groutn Fund, 
Hassachu.>etts Investors Grm·7th Stock Fund, National Investors Corporation, 
and the National Securities Grouth .:>tock Series . The income stocks Here 
selected from the Keystone Custodian Fund , Series K-1, The Puritan Fund, 
the United I ncome Fund , t he National Securities Income 3eries, the 
10 
National Securities Dividend Series , and the Dividend Slmres Fu~d . 
For this paper, cyclical .;tacks may be defined as common sto-cks 
of companies uhose sale and earnings tend to fluctuate widely '\7.:.th 
business cycles . Tne select ion of these stocks v1as rather arbitrary . 
Several iudustries that are generally noted for the cyclical nature of 
their business were selected . From these industries , t~Je ty- five lar3e 
corporations , all of '\Jhich are li:.>ted on the Nevl York Jtock Exchange , 
were d10sen . 
Ti1e cyclical stocl~s v1ere selected from the industry classificat ions 
in the 19j9 edition of Hoody' s Industrial 11anual. The cyclical indu:.>try 
classifications from v1hici1 the stocks uere selected are; Cement, Gypsum, 
h .. 
GlasJ, Floor Coverings , Metals, Machinery and Tools, Electrical E~uipmcnt , 
Tires, Rubber and Rubber Goods , Aviation !-1anufacturing, and ~teel. 
T~e statistical analysis measures t~e relation bet,recn the pay -
out for the entire ten- year period and the per cent increase ~t. the 
various other factors . The ra•·1 data \vere collected from Hoody ' s Industrial 
Hanuals . The payout ratios were coraputed by dividing the total dividends 
per share by the total earnings per ~ 1are for t.1e ten-year period 19!,9 -
19 .J Asset.; , ... ale .. , eari.1ed surplus , earnin..,s , i v:i.dends, an~ market 
price figures '1ere collected for the beginning of the period and the end 
o[ the period. . Fron taese figures, the per cent c~1anges fron the be -
ginning of the periot. to t.1e end of the period Here computeG . In fi:;ur -
ing the per cent chanzes in market price , the fi'-'ures m:!re adjuJted to 
reflect t he effect of stock dividends and stoc~~ splits on t:lC ci.1anses in 
va l ue for the period . 
The analysiu of the relation of p qout ratio::; to price - earnings 
r atios is made for a year of advancing stock pr~ces and a year of dcclin-
ing stocl~ prices . 1934 was selected as a year of advancing stock price~ 
and 19J7 was selected as a year of generally declining .;tock prices as 
measured by the Dow-Jone.; Industrial Average . In 19 3l~ , the Dou- Jone.3 
Industrial Average r ose .Erom a lmv of 279 . S 7 on January 11 to a hi::; 1 of 
~04 . 39 on December 31 . I n 195 7, the avera&e rose slig~tly between 
January and Jul} , but from a high of 520 . 77 on July 12 , tue average de -
clined to a low of 419 . 79 in late Oct ober . On Dece.nber 31 , the avera...,e 
closed at 435 . 9 . Tne price - earnings ratios for l9j4 and 19 7 were 
found by dividing the earnings per st1 re for these years by the average 
The source of this information is Barron's Publis~1ing Co1apany . 
7. 
of the higr1 and lo~7 prices per S11are for the yean; . 
Jcatter diagram:> vlere plotted and are found in Chart.; 2-2.J in 
the Appendix . Regression lines "1.-lere not dra~m, nowever, since t.1ere is 
no attempt in the study to estimate values of the dependent variables 
from t.1e dat1. . Furthermore , tile correlation i:.> lm-1 in all case..; \·1hen 
the limitations of the sample..; are considered . 
In Charts 2-19, the abs cissa represents the independent var -
iable, payout ratio , and the ordinate represents the Jependent variable, 
per cent cnanges . In Charts 20-25, the payout rat1o ia again the in-
dependent variable, and the average price to annual earninss per ..;h~re 
is tne dependeut variable . In Chart 1, the independe,lt variable is 
titne, and the dependent variable is the average of average prices per 
shar e per year. 
In Chapters III and IV, the data are drmm trom ttlC re::;ults of 
a c,ues tionnaire wi.1ich \vas mailed to 148 corporations. These co.11panies 
"l.vere s 1fficiently large and broadl:y mmed to be lis teo on the NeH York 
3tock Exc11ange . Tne sample consisted of the companies in the statistical 
analysis and seventy-three additional cor11panie& . Tnese co,mpanies "l.vere 
not ;:;elec ted at random and tnere may be considerable bias in the data . 
The additional companies were selected arbitrarily by the autnor from 
Moody's I ndustrial Hanual of 19J9 . These companies >vere also equally 
divided between groHth, income, and cyclical co,apanies as defined above . 
The ~ues tionna1re was not designed to form t he basis for any 
s tatistical conclusions, bu t rather to obtain a sampling of manageFlent 
opinions "l.vi th r egard to their responsibility to stocklwlders in 1.1e.t ters 
of dividend policies, financial planning, and stock dividends . A sample 
of the questionnaire, on ''hich a c,['% return ,.,as obtained, is found in the 
Appendix. 
To supplement the questionnaire, material published in books 
and periodicals is also drawn upon . This material is used to introduce 
areas of discussion and to support or contradict findings of the author . 
Much of this material is taken from Jecurity Analysis by Graham and Dodd , 
12 
and Hodern Corporation Finance by Husband and Dockeray. Otner material 
is drawn from the studies cited belmv. 
18. 
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CH.:\.PTER I 
RELATION OF PAYOUT ~iTIOS TO CORPORATE GROt~1 
The retention of earnings is an advantageous method of financing 
1.> 
the expansion of corporations. But for stocknolders, earnings reten-
tion re:ml t s in a sacrifice of current dividend income in the expectation 
of future grouth of earnings , dividends , a nd marke t price. 
growth is not fort.1coming, it vlOuld seem t hat t he stocknolders Here 
deprived unneces.;;arily of the dividends t.1at were \vit,lheld . Tne ques t ion 
arises, then, Hhether lm1 payout ratios are a cause of corpore1te gro>vt h . 
It a ppears do1btful t ha t the retention of earnings by itself can explain 
corporate gr owt h . If the gro\vt h pro:.;pects of a company a r e poor, or if 
t he management i:.; inc01:1petent, t i1e nere r etention of ear ning:3 is not 
likely to result in profitable expansion . Ti1us it would SCC!.l th2.t other 
factors such as t he quality o f nanagement and the der.1and for a co.npany 1 s 
products explain corporate groHth , but it is not the purpose of this 
s t ctdy to de termine v1hat t he other factors are or vlha t it: their r elative 
i mportance. 
If loH payout ratios do not cause grm-.rtn, are t hey closely as s o-
ci~ted with corporate growtn? \Vould it be po..:>sible to predict tlle 
extent of ::;roHth \vi t h any accuracy f rom the size of ti1e dividend payou t ? 
The purpo:;;e of t his chapter is to a ttempt to ans~ver these c;:ue..; tions \lit:l 
resard to samp les of gro\·lt ,l , income, and cyc::.ical stoc.,::; . 
3tatistical correlation analysis is ~.;;ed in order to de termine 
t he relation of payout ratios with t he variables of assets, sales, earned 
surplu:.5 , earnings, and dividends for each of the t~1ree sa.aples of stoc,~::; . 
T~e period covered is 1919 - 19Se . . )cattcr diagra,ns have been plotted 
and are found in Charts 2- 16 in the Appendix . The coefficients of corre -
lation and the mean per cent increase figures are found in Table I, on 
page 25 . 
Payout Ratios and Asset Grmvth 
25 Growth Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent increase 
in total assets for the t-v1enty-five grm>th stocks , Chart 2, is ne 0 ative 
and very low. This indicates that only a very small proportion of the 
total as:>et grmvth of these companies can be explained by t.lCir payout 
ratios . A hi._h, inverse correla t i on, · .owever , \·TOuld provide no justi -
fication for assuming t hat low payout r atios • caus~ ! a:>set urovth. 
Examination of Cha rt 2 :>hous four dots that are atypical from 
the other ciot.; . Eliminat .... on of these companies from the sauple probably 
would result in a higher correlation. Investigation of these atypical 
companies provides an explantion of why the payout ratio is not closely 
associated v1iti1 asset growth in this sample. 
For example, the :scott Paper Company, \·lith a hig'l pa)out ratio of 
uS% for the period, experienced by far the largest gain in total assets, 
over 3ix times . An examinatJ.on of this cmnpany shows that its rapid 
gro\vth during the period was a result primarily of expansion t~1rough 
mergers and acquisitions, not through retained earnings . The four com-
panies that experienced asset expansion in excess of 300% achieved T:Ju ch 
of this grmvth through mergers , and all four had f unded debt in excess 
'i': 
Mathematical co '1putations for this study were .made by t ile OffJ..ce of 
Statistical and Research Services of Boston University in the Boston 
University Computation Laboratory . 
20 . 
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of 20% of their capital structure. Thus the extent of external finan -
cing and the method of expansion are variables 'vhich tend to reduce the 
association betlveen payout ratios and corporate growth . 
New securities offerin~~ , nowever, represented a negligible 
factor in financing the asset grm·lth of these four co:npanies. Dobrovolsky 
found that there is a tendency for external funds to be of 5reater rel-
ative importance at higher expansion rates than at lower expansion rates, 
both with respect to physical assets and total assets, but that botn in-
14 
ternal and external sources are utilized . 
25 Income Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent increase 
in total assets for the twenty-five income stocks, Chart .J, is higher 
than the correlation for the growth stock s~1ple, but is not substantial. 
The mean asset increase for the income stocks , tound in Table I, is less 
than one half of the mean increase of the grmvth stacks . Therefore, 
the income companies , requir ing smaller funds for expansion, were able to 
rely on retained earnings to a greater degree , resulting in a higher in-
verse correlation. For example, the F .. l . ool wort.1 Company, \viti1 a lmv 
payout ratio of 45%, experienced a relat.vely modest gain in total 
assets of 59%. Tnis company relied almost entirely on retained earnings 
to finance expansion dur ing t he period. 
On the other hand, the Colgate - Palmolive Company presents an 
atypical case. This company ' s large increase in assets of 214% is 
explained partly by consol idation of foreign subsidiary accounts in the 
balance sheets in 1957 and 1958, and partly by expansion that was 
financed by funded debt . Bond Stores is also an atypical case . ~·'ith 
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a 65% payout for the period, this company experienced a relatively poor 
increase in assets of 8%. Investigation shm•s that there ~•as a de-
crease in the mortgages and mortgage bond payable accounts, and an in-
crease in the earned surplus account . Apparently the greater part of 
retained earnings in this case was required for current operations and 
debt reduction. 
25 Cyclical Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent increase 
in total assets for the twenty- five cyclical stocks, Chart 4, is the 
highest of the three samples . Examination of Chart 4 shmvs that the 
dispersion of the dots is smaller than the dispersion of dots for the 
other tvlO groups . This higher correlation may be a result, indirectly, 
of the ~nstability of these cyclical companies . Perhaps the managements 
of these companies prefer not to use external funds to any great extent 
so that in periods of slow business act~vity, they will not be burdened 
15 
by excessive debt payments. 
Payout Ratios and Sales Growth 
25 Growth dtocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent increase 
in sales for the twenty-five growth stocks, Chart 5, is very low. Thus, 
the increase in sales for these stocks is explained by the size of their 
payout ratios to a very sligh6, if not negligi ble degree . Apparently 
sales gr m•th v1as accomplished throu0 h mergers and acquisitions, and ,.a., 
financed to a considerable degree from external source~ . A fe\v companies 
~3. 
wi th sales growth well in excess of the mean increase for the group of 
159 . 4%, have precluded a slightly higher correlation. 
25 Income Stocks 
The correlation between the payout ratios and tae per cent in-
crease in sales for the twenty- five income stocks , Chart 6, ir; nega t ive 
and very lm.;r . There is very little relation, then, between the payout 
ratios of these income stocks and tneir gro\vth in sales during the ten-
year period . 
In both assets and sales, the mean per cent incr ease for the 
grO\vt h stocks is more than double t hat of the income stocks . On the 
other hand, the mean payout ratio of the 0 r m.;rth stocks is only four per-
centage points less than the mean payout ratio of the income stocks . 
This seems to indicate that factors other than the level of the payout 
r atio are responsible for corporate growth. 
25 Cyclical 3tocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent increase 
in sales for the twenty- five cyclical stocks, Chart 7, is abo lov1. 
Elimination of t\vo atypical cases t-10uld result in a higher correlation. 
Nevertheless , since t t1e sample is non-random, a higher correlation \vould 
not provide a basis for inferring that low payout ratios cause sales 
gr O\vt h . Furthermore, it is possible that low payouts may be caused by 
the other factors that promote corporate 6 rm.;rth . 
Table I. Correlation of Payout Ratios and Hean 
Per Cent Increase in Assets , Sales, Earned 
Surplus, Earnings, and Dividends, 
1949 -195o 
Coefficient of Mean Per Cent 
Assets Correlation Increase 
Grov1th Stocks -0 . 1117 184 . 5 
Income Stocks -0 . .:>831 90. 4 
Cyclical Stocks -0 . 7032 15(.3 
.:>ales 
Grmvtl1 Stocks 
-0 . 2494 159 . :;. 
Income Stocks -0 . 3u83 76.0 
Cyclical Stocks -0 . 4727 129 . 1 
Earned Surplus 
GroHth St ocks 
-0 . 1561 2&8 . 4 
I ncome Stocks -O. b792 176. 3 
Cyclical :>tacks -0 . 29 85 259 . 9 
Ear nings 
Gr ov1th Stocks -0. 0651 113 . 8 
Income Stocks -0 . 3904 46 . 5 
Cyclical .:>tacks -0 . 5925 128 . 7 
Dividends 
Gro-v1th Stocks -0 . 0111 196 . 0 
Income Stocks -0 . 5262 105 . 3 
Cyclical Stocks -0 . 3700 197. 6 
Source : Data for computabions co l lected from 
Moody ' s Industriql Manuals 
Payout Ratios and Earned Surplus Growth 
25 Gr owth Stocks 
tt.~. 
The correlation between payout ratios and t he per cent increase 
in earned surplus for the twanty- five growth stocks, Chart 3 , is very loH. 
Only a small proportion of the variation in the growth ot earned surplu3 
is explained by the independent variable, payout ratio , but t he low cor -
relation is explained in part by the extrame values of the dependent 
variable, earned ~urplus . These extreme values are explained in turn 
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by the effect of appropriated surplus reserves and stock dividends on 
the earned surplus account . In the r esearch, tne autnor has observed 
that the growt h stocks wi t h low payout ratios were inclined to declare 
stock dividends mor e frequently than t he stocks with higher payout 
ratios , thereby r educing t he size of t he earned surplus account . Of 
t he twelve stocks with payout r atios of SO% or less, nine declared 
s t ock dividends during the period. On the other hand , of the t hirteen 
grm'lth stocks with payout ratios in excess of 51%, only t wo declared 
stock dividends bet\'leen 1949 and 19.)8 . Various appropriated reserves 
of course had a similar effect on the earned surplus account. 
I n 1958, for example, the Gulf Oil Corporation, v1ith a payout 
of less than 25% in cash dividends , carried to surplus $329 million of 
ear nings . After cash dividends of approximately $76 mi llion, the 
company still retained in tne earned sur plus account about 757o of the 
earnings . During the year , hm'lever , earned surplus was also reduced 
by $133 million as a result of stock dividends and appropriated r eser ves . 
Thus, with a 75% retention of the year ' s earnings , tllere was a net 
addition to surplus of only 36% of earnings . 
On the other hand, the Sco tt Paper Company , with a 68% payout 
for the period , had an increase of over fourteen times in earned surplus . 
This rise is partly due to the portion of earnings retained du r ing the 
period , but the major part of the gain was a r esult of carrying to sur-
plus over $17 million of the earned surplus of the Joundview Pulp and 
Paper Company, merged in 1951, and approximately $19 million of the 
earned surplus of the Hollingsworth and l!hi tney Company, merged in 19J4. 
.26 . 
25 Income Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and t~1e per cent increase 
in earned surplus for the twenty- five inco;ne stocks, Chart 9, is higher 
for the income stoc1.(S than for the growth stocks. Examination of Chart 
9 shm-1s that the dots are less t·7idely di::;persed . The somewhat higher 
correlation may be explained by the fact that feH stock dividends tvere 
declared by these comp.mies during the period. As a result, the growtn 
of earned surplus for the incomes companies was c1ore closely associated 
with the amount of earnings retained . 
25 Cyclical jtocks 
The correlation between payout rat1os and the per cent increase 
in earned surplus for the t\venty - five cyclical stock::;, Chart 10, is also 
found to be very low. The large number of stock dividends declared by 
the comp.mies in the cyclical stock sample , as in t he growth stock sample, 
precludes the existence of a high correlation bet\'leen the pa.~out raLo 
and the grm·1th of earr.ed surplus . 
Payout Ratios and Earnings Growth 
25 Growth Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent increase 
in earnings for the t>'lenty - five grm1th stocks, Chart 11 , is extremely lm •. 
Examination of Chart 11 sno.vs the correlation graphically . The dots are 
>videly scattered and shoH a complete absence of any trend . The data i:llu -
strate that while many so - called 11 growth companies' retain a l arge portion 
of earnings to finance future groHtn , there is considerable variation in 
the actual resul t s. For example, the Sunbeam Corporation, wi t h a 38% 
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payout for the period, increased its earnings by only 30%, while the 
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, \lith a 41% payout, experienced 
an 135% gain in earnings . An even greater difference is found bet\veen 
the performance of the U. S. Ply\vood Corporation and the Outboard Harine 
Corporation, bot~ of which paid out 42% of earnings . 
experienced a gain in earnings under 1%, while the earnings of Outboard 
Narine increased approximately five times. 
25 Income Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent in-
crease in earnings for the twenty- five inco1ne stocks, Chart 12, is low, 
and indicates that the size of the payou t ratio cannot explain the 
changes in earnings . 
Eleven of the t\venty- five income stocks suffered a decline in 
earnings durJng the ten- year period . The mean increase for the income 
group of Lw. 5% is less than one half of ti1e mean increase of the other 
two groups . The elimination of the Pepsi -Cola Company fro .1 the sa.nple, 
\vhich increased earnings almost four and one half times, uoul i reduce 
the mean increase fro:n 46 . 5% to approximately 30%. An investment in 
these stocks as a group for income and stability would have resulted in 
a large sacrifice of earnings growth. There is no evidence, however, 
that the poor earnings performance of these stocks was a result of hit-,n 
payout ratios . However, the results are apparently a reflection of 
the poor record of many so - called i ncome stocks' which are generally 
characterized by relatively high payout ratios. 
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25 Cyclical Stocks 
The correlation be t tV"een payout ratios and the per cent in-
crease in earnings for the twenty-five cyclical stock~ , Chart 13, is low, 
but somet-lhat higher than the correlation for the other two groups . 
Inspection of Chart 13 shm-1s that >-lith the exception of the tt1o :extreme 
values of the independent variables, the scatter of dots forms an almost 
vertical pattern t-lithin the 30- 60% range, indicating a lack of correlat"on 
for these stocks . Obviously the size of the payout ratio explains only 
a small portion of the increase in earnings . 
Payout Ratios and Dividend Grm-1th 
25 Growth Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent increase 
in dividends for the twenty- five growth stocks, Chart 14, is almost neglig-
ible . Inspection of Chart 14 shm-1s the wide dispersion of the dots . 
The variation in dividend grov1th for these stocks is very large. The 
vertical alignment of five dots to1ithin the 6[, -72% level emphasizes the 
varied results . Obviously there is no relation betto1een dividend grm-16h 
and the size of the payout ratio for t his sample of grm-1th stocks. 
25 Income Stocks 
The correlation bett-1een payout ratios and the per cent increase 
in dividends for the twanty - five income stocks, Chart 15, is higher than 
that of the grm-1th stocks , but there is no indication that lo,·J payout 
ratios explain large increases in dividends . 
Hhile eleven of the income stocks suffered earnings declines 
during the period, only five of the companies disbursed smaller clivi-
dends in 19)G t han in 1949 . Furthermore, the mean increase in divi-
dends '"as much higher than tne mean increase in earnings . Apparently 
these companies as a group atte1apted to maintain a stability to their 
dividend payments wherever possible . 
25 Cyclical Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent in-
crease in dividends for the twenty-five cyclical stocks, Chart 16, is 
low. There is little to conclude f rom this data except that tne level 
of the payout ratio explains only a small part of the dividend growth 
of these companies . 
Summary of Payout Ratios and Corporate Grm-1th 
A low negative correlation is found between the payout ratios 
and the various measures of corporate growth under consideration for 
these samples of stocks . The highest correlations are found for the 
cyclical stock group, except in the cases of earned surplus and dividend 
grm-1th . Of the three samples, the grol-lth stocks exhibit the lowest 
correlation. For these three groups of stocks , then, there is a low 
association between tue level of the payout ratio and the extent of 
corporate growth. 
The lol-l association is explained partly by the effect on 
growth of facto r s other than the payout rat~o . The grm-1th of assets, 
sales, and earnings can be accomplished through mer gers ra ther than re -
tained earnings . The extent of external financing also has an effect 
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on the association between payout ratios and growth . The growth of 
earned surplus is influenced by factors other than the payout ratio, 
such as stock dividends and surplus reserves. 
In this study, a higher correlation probably would be obtained 
by eliminating the companies whose performances are atypical fro~ the 
other companies. Hmvever, it would be improper to conclude that loH 
payout ratios cau..,e growth, even if the correlation \·lere con'-'iderably 
higner. It seems more logical to assume that other factors explain 
grmvth . l'here tne prospects for grmvth are present, management is 
encouraged to retain earnings. Thus lo>v payout ratios rnay be a result 
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of growth rather than a cause . 
The degree of association bet"1een payout ratios and corporate 
grotvth depends partly on the extent to Wllich the growth is financed by 
retained earnings . For example, a hign payout and a superior gro\vth 
record might be commensurate where a company expands as a result of 
mergers or finances its grmvth with external sources of funas. The 
degree of association also depends partly on the extent to which ~rowth 
is affected by other factors that are difficult to ~easure. The 
cluality of management and the grmV'th prospects of the company and in-
dustry appear to the author to be the principal factors that cause 
grmvth. Assuming that the author's observations are reasonable, the 
grmvth of a corporation probably depends less on the amount of funds 
available than on the profitable, efficient use of those funds by the 
operating executives . 
It seems, then, that estimates of corporate grmvtn based on tne 
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level of the payout ratio would be unreliable . There are too many vari -
ables that affect corporate growth to permit its prediction from t he size 
of the dividend payouts alone . 
:::.2 . 
CHAPTER II 
RELATION OF PAYOUT RATIOS TO HARKET PRICE 
In an article in the April , 1959 issue of For tune , a list of 
characteristics designa t ed by growth stock specialists as desirable 
attributes of growth companies i s presented . In discussing t hese 
characteris tics it is stated that dividends from growth companies are 
small in relation to earnings as such companies "ah-1ays retain a major 
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part of earnings . On the other hand, Graham and Dodd state that: 
Even in growth stocks there is surely no clear 
indication that a low dividend in rela t ion to 
earnings is regar ded by the stock market as a 
positive advant age .lu 
Thus ~-1hile lm-1 payout ratios are considered a character is tic 
of gro~-1th stocks, there is some doubt as to the effect that such lm-1 pay -
outs have on the valuation of s tocks . This apparent difference of atti-
tudes toward the merits of earnings retention leads to several questions . 
Is there a relationship bet~-1een payout ratios and market price 
changes over a period of year s? Is there a difference in the associ -
ation of payouts uith market price appreciation bet~-1een gro>vth, income , 
and cyclical stocks? Is there any apparent basis for predict ing the 
extent of market price appreciation from the size of the payout ratio? 
Over a period of years is there any apparent tendency for lm-1 payout 
stovks t o appreciate at a faster rate than high payout stocks? I s 
t here any appreciable association between payout r atios and market valu -
ation as measured by price- earnings ratios at a given point in time? 
The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to ans~·7er ti1e above 
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questions, ~vithin the limitations of the samples . As in the previous 
chapter, statistical correlation analysis is used to determine the re-
lation of the payout ratio to market price behavior for these samples of 
stocks. 
The scatter diagrams of the payout ratios and per cent increase 
in market price from 1949 - 1958 are found in the \ppendix, C~1arts 17, 18 and 
19 . The coefficients of correlation and the mean per cent increases for 
these three samples of stocks are found in Table II, page 36. The time 
series of low-payout and high-payout stocks for the period 1949 -195&, is 
found in Chart I, page 37. The data for the time series are tabulated 
in Table III, page 36 . Charts 20-25, which are scatter diagrams of tne 
payout ratios of the three groups of stocks and their price--earnings ratios 
in 1954 and 1957, are found in the <~pendix . The coefficients of cor -
relation and the mean price -earnings ratios for 19J4 and 19 ~ 7 for the 
three samples of stocks are found in Table IV, page 40 . 
Once again, it should be pointed out that the sa,nples ~vere not 
selected at random. Therefore , tne resJl ts can describe t11e rel.a tion-
ships for these particular stocks only, not for corporations generally . 
Payout Ratios and Market Price Changes 
25 Growth 3tocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent increase 
in market price for the twenty-five groHth stocks, Chart 17, is lo>v. 
The belief that the low payout ratios tnat generally characterize growth 
stocks are associated with corporate grmvth and consequer.t appreciaL.on 
in market price is not supported by tt1is sample of grmvtn stock companies. 
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The elimination of atypical cases probably \·JOuld result in a some\vhat 
higher correlation, but inspection of Chart 17 shows that the dots are 
widely dispersed and the correlation is very low. Thus t11e market price 
appreciation of these stocks can be explained only to a very small degree 
by toe: size of their payout ratios . 
25 Income ..:>tocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent increase 
in market price for the tv7enty - five income stocks, Chart lu, is consider-
ably higher than for the grmvth stock sample . Examination of Chart 18 
demonstrates again that elimination of extreme values of the dependent 
variable would result in a higher correlation . However, in view of the 
limitations of the sample, it is impossible to conclude that there is a 
clo~e association between payout ratios and market price apprecietion . 
The mean increase in market price for ti1.e grov7th stocks is 
426 . 6%, almost three times the mean increase of the income stocks, 1(3. L%. 
The superior results of the groHth stock sample, hmvever, cannot be attri-
buted to any fundamental difference in payout policies , since the mean 
payout ratio of the income ttocks is only four percentage points greater 
than the mean payout for the grov1th stocks . 
It is probable that the superior performance of the gro>·7th 
stocks was the result of other factors than the payout ratio, such as the 
quality of management and the grm·Jth potential of the industry. It is 
beyond the scope of this study, hmvever , to attempt to determine the rel -
ative importance of these various factors . Horeover , it has been m:itten: 
The factors that determine the market price of common 
stocks are often obscure and probably vary considerably 
from one corporation to another . l9 
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At any rate, it '..rould seem that investors and security analysts 
should be cautious of giving the level of the payout ratio more than a 
nominal ,.,eight when evaluating common stocks . Furthermore, ·~arkavay 
has stated that a low payout ratio does not cause price appreciation, 
but rather that lm·1 payouts and market price appreciation are both a 
result of a third factor \vhich he believes is the rate of gro\lth in de-
mand for the products of a company . He maintains that it is useless 
to predict price appreciation on the basis of the payout ratio and erron-
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eous to speak of earnings retention as causing price appreciation. 
25 Cyclical Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and the per cent increase 
in market price for the twenty- five cyclical stock, Chart 19 , is consid-
erably higher than for the other two samples of stocks . It would seem 
that the payout ratios are associated inversely with the market price 
appreciation of these stocks to a considerable degree . Nevertheless, 
with a small sample of this kind the association may be due to chance, 
and the results must be considered as inconclusive . 
Comparative Price Behavior of Lm..r-payout and High-payout Stocks 
Chart 1 is a time series showing the average price increase per 
year for ten low-payout stocks and ten high-payout stocks selected from 
the three samples of stocks. 
Table II . Correlation of Payout Ratios and Mean 
Per Cent Increase in t~rket Price 
1949 -1958 
Coefficient of Hean Per Cent 
Assets 
Growth Stocks 
Income Stocks 
Cyclical Stocks 
Correla tion 
-0 . 1658 
-0 . 5701 
-0.7970 
Increase 
426. 6 
143 . l 
371.1 
Source: Data for computations collected from 
Hoody ' s Industrial Hanuals 
Table III . Average Price of High-Payout 
and Low- Payout Stocks 
19l:.9 - 1958 
Average Price 
Year of Ten Low-
Payout Stocks 
19 <-: 9 41.3 
1950 57 . 5 
1951 79 . 9 
1952 87. 1 
1953 88 . 4 
1954 133. 4 
1955 204 . 0 
1956 267 . 7 
195 7 246. 6 
1958 254. 1 
Source : Data for computations collected 
from Moody ' s Industrial Manuals 
\verage Price 
of Ten High-
Payout Stocks 
62. 6 
78 . 3 
97 . 6 
97 . [., 
102 . 2 
127 . 1 
170. 7 
l o9 . 2 
185 . o 
195 . 0 
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The mean payout for these ten stocks is 33 . 2% and the range is bet tveen 
16io and 38%. In 1949 the average market price v1as approximately $40. 
The average rose to $83 in 1952 and 1953 and then climbed rapidly to 
37. 
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$267 in 195o. In 1957, a year of generally declining stock prices, the 
average lost about $21, but rose to $254 in 1958 . 
The mean payout for the ten high pay-out stocks is 76. 1% and 
the range is between 65% and 89%. The average market price for this 
group in 1949 was $62 from which it rose to about $97 in 1951 . From 
1951 through 1953 there was little change in the average, but in 1956 
it rose to $189 . After a slight dip in 1957, it climbed to $195 in 
1958 . 
A comparison of the two groups shows that although the low-
payout group started from a lower base in 1949, it appreciated in value 
at a faster rate than the high- payout stocks after 1953 . The average 
of the low-payout group passed the average of the high- payout group in 
1954. 
The superior performance of the low- payout group is qui te evi-
dent . The high- payout group had an increase in average market price of 
210%, but the lo,-1-payout group increased more than five times. The re-
sults appear to support a conclusion of Harkavay that over a period of 
years there is a tendency for stock prices to vary inversely t'lith the 
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size of the payout rat io . 
Payout Ratios and Price -Earnings Ratios - 1954 
25 Grm-1th Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and price -earnings ratios 
for the t\-lenty-five growth stocks , Chart 20, is positive and qui te low. 
Nevertheless, the correlation appears to be reduced as a result of a few 
atypical ratios . For example, the Sunbeam Corporat ion sold at sixty-one 
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times average annual earnings during the year. This abnormally high 
ratio is a result of a drastic but~mporary decline in the company's 
earnings for the year . In 1953 and 1955, SunbeaLn common stock sold at 
approximately ten times earnings . 
25 Income Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and price -earnings 
ratios for the t't-7enty-five income stocks, Chart 21, is again positive 
and low. The payout ratios and price-earnings ratios for this sample 
are not closely associated, but the correlation probably is reauced by 
Bond Stores . This company als o suffered a large drop in earnings in 
1954 without a corresponding decline in the price of its common stock . 
25 Cyclical Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and price -earnings ratios 
in 1954 for the twenty- five cyclical stocks, Chart 22, is higher than for 
the other two samples, but is still rather lo'·'· Thus for these stocks 
there is only a slight tendency for price-earnings ratios to rise in 
direct proportion to the size of the payout ratio. 
Payout Ratios and Price-Earnings Ratios - 19S7 
25 Gro,vth Stocks 
The correlation between payout ratios and price -earnings ratios 
in 1957 for the twenty-five growth stocks , Chart 23, is also very low. 
Examination of Chart 23 snmvs that the dots are widely scattered. The 
size of the pay-out ratio does not explain the level of the price-earnings 
Table I V. Correlation ~f Payout Ratios and 
Mean Price -Earnings Ratios 
19)4 and 1957 
Coefficient of 
Correlat ion 
Hean Price-
Earnings Ratio 
Price-Earnings 
Ratios - 1954 
Growth Stocks 
Income Stocks 
Cyclical Jtocks 
Price -Earnings 
Ratios - 1957 
Growth dtocks 
Income .:itocks 
Cyclical Stocks 
·.-0 . 0568 
:0 . 2783 
+0. 3560 
.-0. 3555 
-o . t~256 
- 0 . Q£.48 
Source : Data for computations collected from 
Moody's I ndustrial Hanuals 
ratios for this sample to any appreciable degree . 
25 Income Stocks 
17 . 7 
12. ) 
10 . .) 
17 . 4 
11. L. 
12.o 
L;Q. 
The correlation between payout ratios and price -earnings 
ratios in 1957 for the t\Jenty - five income stocks , Chart 24 , is negative 
and very lm.,. Once again the payout ratios sho,., a lo\l association \'lith 
the level of price -earnings ratios . 
25 Cyclical Stocks 
The correlation between payout rat i os and price -earnin~s ratios 
for the twenty- five cyclical stocks , in 1957 , Chart 25, is very lm1. 
Examination of Chart 25 s hO\\IS the \lide dispersion and lack of trend to 
the dots . Ther e is obviously little association between payout ratios 
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and price -earnings ratios for these stocks during 1957. 
In a year of advancing stock prices and a year of generally 
declining stock prices , then, it is found that there is a negli~ible 
correlation between payout ratios and price- earnings ratios for these 
three samples of stocks . On the other hand , Burrell concluded that 
for a sample of growth stocks he studied, the high- payout stoc~s sold 
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at consistently higher price -earnings ratios than the low-payout stocks . 
The results appear t o contradict the findings of Burrell, but 
actually may not be inconsistent when the difference in data is con-
sidered . In the Burrell study, stocks that were very similar in all 
respects except payout ratios were arranged in quartiles according to 
payout and it was found that the high payout stocks sold at higher price -
earnings ratios . 
The key to the difference in findings seems to be that the 
stocks in the Burr ell study wer e similar in all other respects, except 
payout, thereb) minimizing the effects of other factors that might in-
fluence price - earnings ratios . The effect of these factors on price -
earnings ratios in the present study undoubtedly served to reduce the 
correlation. Without the influence of these other variables, it is 
probable that a higher correlation >vould have been found . 
Graham and Dodd divide the factor s that affect price- earnings 
ratios into two groups. One consists of factors that are reflected in 
the financial data of a company, such as the dividend, profitability, 
stability of earnings, growt h of sales and earnings , and credit standing 
of a company. On the other hand, there are intangible factors such as 
the nature and prospects of the industry, comparative position and 
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pro.;pects of the compan) , and the quality of manageraent . 
Cottle and T nituan, in a study of corporate earr.ing pot·Jer and 
market valuation in different industr y group;.; , found tnat tae payout 
r atio and the factor of stability \·Jere most i.nportant in influencing 
price - ear nings ratios . They commente 
These analyse~ of E-P ratios indicate t~at insofar 
as these oata are concer ned and for the period 
covered, stability of earnings and the payout rate 
.-Jere ec.ually impor tant in determining tt1e E- P ratio 
and that combined they explain about 70% of tne 
diffe r ences among the indu.:;trie"'' average E- P ratios 
for the 1935 -55 span. 24 
Jummary of Payout Rat ios and Nar ket Prices 
A low negative cor relation is found bet\<Jeen payout ratios and 
market price appreciation for the growth and income stocks . Fhile the 
correlation migi.1t be somm.;hat higher if certain extreme values \vere 
el i minated, the a"'.;ociation of the two variables is ~uite low. Tnus 
the payout ratio can explain only a small part of the market price 
appr eciation of these stocks . 
\ considerably hibner correlation is found between payout 
ratios and market price appreciation fo r the cyclical stocks . Hm-1ever, 
to generalize ti1e results for the statistical population of stocks would 
be improper since the sm;1ple is non-random. The relatively nign 
correlation may be due to chance . The results suggest the desirability 
of furtner research using rando1n sample"' . 
The performAnce of the growth stocks I·Jas far superior to tne 
performance ot the income stocks in terms of market price appreciation, 
but this cannot be attributed to differences in payo;lt ratios since t:1e 
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mean payout ratio of the grmvth stocks is only four percentage points 
lower than the mean p'lyout of the income stocks . The superior results 
of the gro\lth .;;tocks are a result of other factors that enhance the 
growth of sales, earnings, and the consequent appreciation of r.1arket 
price . 
The lou correlation and the fact that ot1er variables influence 
the gro\olth in share prices preclude attempting to predict the market 
price of these stocks from the payout ratios . 
A group of ten low- payout stocks demonstrates superior results 
in terms of market price appreciation over a ten-year period u:1en com-
pared with a group of ten high- payout stocks . Jince the samples \·Jere 
not selected at random, however , 1.t cannot be concluded that lmv-payout 
stocks generally appreciate at a faster rate than l.1igh-payout stocks . 
The results can be considered merely as an illustration of this hypothes.._ 
A low correlation between payout ratios and price -earnings 
ratios is found for all three groups of stocks in both a year of advancing 
stock prices and a year of declining stock prices. The correlation is 
lm-.r probably as a result of ot~1er factors that affect the valuation of 
securitie..; . The factors may be reflected in the financial data of tne 
company or may be intangibles s uch 'lS the quality of management and the 
prospects for the company and the industry. 
4L: . 
CHAPTER III 
PAYOUT POLICIES \ND STOCKHOLDER- l'lANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
The power to determine the size of ~ividends gives to the 
board of directors of a corporation direct control over tile return on 
investment to stockholders . Since the only tangible gains to be de -
rived fro!l1 a common stock investment are in the form of G.ividends and 
market price appreciation, the dividend payout ratio appears to be in-
extricably involved witn stockholder - management relations. T~1US the 
study of the association of payout ratios with corporate growta and 
marke t price appreciation leads to certain ques tions regarding stock -
holder relations . Is it not incumbent upon corporations to clearly 
state t heir dividend policies in order t ha t stockholder s and potential 
investo~s may better evaluate the suitability of an investment to their 
personal needs? In dividend decisions should stockholders' needs 
supercede those of the business? Furthermore, since tne decisions to 
disburse or retain earnings are of direct concern to the stock:1olders, 
\·lOuld it not be equitaole to allow them to determine for themselves uhat 
these dividend policies should be? 
In this chapter an attempt is made to determine management opin-
ions tm-1ard the above ques t ions . T~1e material i..> based on the results 
of the first three questions in a management survey made by t.1e author. 
Confidential ~uestionnaires were mailed to the 75 corporations studied 
in the previous chapters and 73 additional companie~. The selection 
of the additional companies \vas purely arbitrary, the only rualif ications 
being that they be listed on the Ne\v York Jtock Exch;.Jnge and be evenly 
divJ.ded betv1een grm.;rth, income , and cyclical stocks as defined in the 
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introduction to this paper . Since the companies 111ere not selected 
randomly , there is a strong probability of bias in the selection pro -
cedure , and there is no statistical basis for generalizing from the re-
sults as to tLle attitudes of corpora t ions not included in this stuciy . 
Further more , care must be taken in interpreting the results as t l1e stated 
answers may not in all cases reflect the true feelings of the respondents . 
Of the 14[, questionnaires tnaile , 72 returns \,·ere received, a 
4G% response . Of these, 1& were from growth co,:lp·mie~, 27 1-1ere from 
income companies , and 27 1ver e from cyclical co:tpanies. A copy of the 
questionnaire is found in the Appendix in Table XI. Ti1e tabulated re -
sults , stratified by class of stock , are also found in the Appendix in 
Tables XII and Al i i . 
There is some difficulty in adapting the questionnaire form 
of survey to tne follmving area of study as in many cases the questions 
are not answered easily by yesn or 'no . As a result many of the res-
pondents GUalified their answers with additional cormnents . No::;t of t.1e 
material in the follo1ving sections is based on their ans1vers and com!lents . 
Statements of Dividend Policies 
The need for adequate disclosure of information about the cor-
poration, particularly 1vith regard to dividend policies, is of increasing 
importance because of the t rend toward broader ownership of common stocks 
either dir ectly by the public or indirectly by insurance companies, mutual 
funds , and pension funds . This trend is a result of our tax system wilich 
discourages \·Iealthy investors from investing in common stock::; and has led 
one authority to advocate that large corporations should seek equity funds 
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from small investors and officers of financial institutions . 
4.6 . 
Guthman and Dougall state that a corporation that has attracted 
small investors should follow a regular dividend policy that will re-
fleet the wishes of the stockholders, should clearly state this policy, 
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and avoid any capricious changes of the dividend . Husband and Dockeray 
also assert tnere is a responsibility for management to make knmm its 
dividend policy. They cite the dividend records of the Radio Corpor -
ation of America , which paid no cash dividend for seventeen years, and 
the Aluminum Corporation of America , which did not pay a cash dividend 
for the first fourteen years of its existence . Commenting on the 
records of these t\-10 companies t he authors state : 
The only reasonable explanation for the type of policy 
that existed in the earlier years is that tte management 
believed i t \-lise to conserve cash and to make it available 
for expansion. On the other hand, manage.nent may be 
lacking in its failure to observe a sense of proper res-
ponsibility to the stockholders who invest for the purpos e 
of realizing return . Especially would this be true if 
investors were invited to participate \-lithout inforu1ation 
to the effect that dividends would not be paid for an 
extended period of time . The declaration of such policy 
would at least have the merit of due notice , but failure 
to do so is a use of other people's money on the basis of 
cuiet concealment . 27 
Graham and Dodd suggest that public1 y o\med corporations s 1ould 
state their dividend policies occasionally in annual reporto or at 
annual meetings, and always \-lhen offering common stock . They state that 
such statements should cover the approximate average payout and the clivi -
dend policy with regard to fluctuations in annual earnings. .>ucn poli -
cies should be ''adequate and fair in relation to the normal expectations 
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of the typical outside stockholders . " 
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Thus the desirability of stating dividend policies to stock-
holders and potential investor s appear s to be well accepted by authorities 
on investments and corporation finance . M1at then are the actual prac-
tices of corporations and what are the opinions of managements with re -
gard to such statements? 
The first ques tion asked of the executives in the survey was: 
Do you believe it is an obligation of management to state 
clearly to stockholders its dividend policy? 
Approximately 75% of t he replie s to this cuestion v1ere in the 
affirmative . Thus the majority of the respondents acknm.;rledged an obli -
gation to state dividend policies to stockholders; yet Graham and Dodd 
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state that in actual practice this is sel dom done . It seems reasonable 
to assume that the Graham and Dodd findings wou ld also apply to tne con-
panies in this survey . Furthermore, one autnority on the subject in-
vestigated a large number of annual reports and found tnat c.lividend 
policy is seldom mentioned other than to state \vllat amounts \vere paid 
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during the year . 
;,.rhile the major ity designated that there is an obligation for 
companies to state their dividend policies, only two respondents commen-
ted favorably on ~uch practice . One stated : 
Full disclos ure of a corporat.on's financial affairs, 
including its dividend policy, is an obligation of 
management and directors in my opinion to its stocknolders . 
The other respondent '-l.ualified his statement of approval with the follow -
ing comment: 
I believe it is the obligation of management to infor.n 
stockholders of corporate dividend policy; nowever, 
it is difFicult to be specific as to the expected per-
centage of payout since thi~ will vary from time to 
time due to expansion plans or the business eco 10:ny 
\·lhich might affect the profit position of the coMpany 
in question. 
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The remaining conwents on this que~tion rai8~d objections to 
stating dividend policies . For example , a return from a steel company 
indicated that it was impossible to state a definite policy as conditionG 
change, especially in the steel industry. An executive of a rapid -
grmvth electronics company also held that a statement of dividend policy 
\vOuld be inadvisable as conditions are apt to cnange , particularly in a 
dynamic business . The president of a large machinery concern s tated 
his position as follows: 
A dividend policy must be flexible . Therefore, a 
1 statement 1 could \vi~ely be no morP than a recognition 
of the obli0 ation of a return on investment t> stlare-
holders . 
One executive stated that it is desirable to state d vidend 
policies but not an obligation. Another commented that it i~ desirable 
but only in very 5eneral terms, ''certainl y not in terms of specific 
cormnitments . ' A representative vie\v of the di:ssenting comments uas 
expressed by t Lle cha iru1an of a large chemical conpany : 
I \vould see no narm in management 1 s endeavorin3 to 
outli~e in very general terms a so -called dividend 
polic) for the benefit of its stockholders, but I 
would somewhat question the \visdom of doing so for 
it might be difficult to explain later \vhy management 
had departed from that policy, though its reasons for 
doing so may be very sound . In answer to this question, 
I would say tnat there is certainly no obligati on on 
managewent to do a .. YO'l suggest, and I \vould con.3ider 
it inadvisable to do so . 
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On balance, the respondents express the belief that it is an 
obligation of management to state its dividend policy to stocknolders . 
Evidence has been presented, however , to indicate that such statements 
of dividend policy are seldom made in actual practice . 
these results indicate? 
Hh<Jt, then, do 
The li~itations of the sample preclude generalizing for all 
corporations, but for tne&e companie~, at least, one fact seems evident . 
Apparently these executives are aware of the desir ability of c.~.early 
stated dividend policies from the standpoint of investors and stock10lders , 
but their failure to state dividend policies in actual practice is evi-
dence of mere lip-service to the problem. 
This failure to follmv- <1 policy \vhicil they acknowlcuge to be 
desirable is a reflection of their apparent reluctance to commit them-
selves to dividend practices that might be difficult to adhere to at 
some time in the future. Tneir cormnents to tne effect t~1at statements 
of dividend policy should be in very general terms appears to be evidence 
of their rel~ctance. In further support of t!:lis viet.,, examination of 
Table XII in the Appendix shows that, while approximately T~. of tne 
growth and cyclical companies answered this questioa in the affirmative, 
83% of the income comp<J.nies answered 'yes . " The implication see1:w to 
be that for tnese income companies, which are characterized by relatively 
stable earnings , a stated dividend policy would be less onerous, since 
the problem of adhering· to .mch policy is mini.nized by tne nat•Jre of the 
industry. 
Jtockholders and the Corpon.te Entity 
The second question asked of the execut:i vcs \vas: 
Do you believe t~at tne prinary responsibility of 
management is to tne stockholders ratner t11an to 
the corporation as a separate entity in itself? 
According to Husband and Dockeray, tnis c1uestion is 'one of the r.1o..>t 
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challenging issues of our day . ' They state that it is weLl established 
tiat the obligation bot~ legally and nominally is to the stockholders, 
and they believe that management should assume the full stature of 
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trusteeship. 
Pearson Hunt , emphasizing the t rustee relationship to snare -
holders, po..;es questions which management should ask itself in develop -
ing a program of stockholder r elations for its company . One of tl.1e se 
questions suggests that management should determine tttose company poli -
cies that can be varied to best suit the inter ests of the stockholders . 
He maintains t~at some managements 'think too much in ter .1s of policie..; 
\vhich suit the interests of t he company - as if 'ti.1e COI'lpany' uere it -
se l f an economic entity with interests of its mvn . He sees these in-
terests as avoidanc e of indebtedness, maximum use of internal sources of 
funds, r aising ne\17 funds by selling addit ional corrnnon stock, and gro\oJt~1 
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i n size . 
Graham and Dodd 11old that while corporations are aware of an 
obligation to pay adequate dividends , they have gener ally subordinated 
this obligation to a feeling that they must protect and ~trengthen the 
company , and us ually justify t his on the ground that wl.1atever is good 
for the business must be good for the stockholders . ' They maintain, 
however , that abuses of this sort are m:1ch more prevalent in smaller 
corporations, and that the majority of large, \videly held corporations 
do not subordinate the s tockholders to tl1e corporate entity . 
")'_, 
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It is apparent then t 11at ti1ere are instance;; v1here t11e inter -
ests of the stockholders may be divergent from the interests of the cor-
poration itself. For example, if the majority of stockholders are in-
dividuals requiring maximum current income f r om their investment, the 
desirability of retaining earnings to finance expan::;ion might be pre -
eluded. 
Approximately 78% of the replies to ttlis question ~vere in tile 
affirmative . Of fourteen respondents who declined to answer this 
question, ten stated that the stockholders and the corporate entity are 
one and the same and cannot be separated . Four executives comnented 
that management is responsible to the Board of Directors, ~·1ho in turn 
are responsible to t he stockholders . But is it possible, senerally, to 
separate management and the Board of Directors? Graham and Dodd think 
not , as '' in so many cases the boards and the executives form an indis -
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tinguiahable vlhole - i.e . e single ''llanagement 1 • ' It is certainly 
doubtful that a board of directors often would take actions that ran con-
trary to the advice and reco1nmendations of the operating execut ves . 
In some cases, moreover, boards "are composed exclusively of the exec•1tive 
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operat1.ng personnel . · 
~Vhile the majority ans~,rered this question in the affirmative, 
the genera l concensus of the r espondents is tnat in tne lon::, r un , tne 
best interests of both the stock,1olders and the corporate entity will 
be identical. One executive stated that technically it Has management's 
prime responsibility to serve the company , but that as a practical matter 
questions .;eldom arise in \vi1ich the interests of stockholders and the 
.:)2. 
corporation are at odds . He stated that if such a question should ar~se, 
the management should look to the interests of the corporation first . 
The treasurer of a steel company stated that it is very diffi -
cult to say ~vhether management' & primary responsibility is to the in -
vestor or to the company . He believes that the main responsibility of 
management is to operate the company in tne most profitable manner . 
l'hether or not the stockholders are benefited vlill aepend on manage -
ment's tiuccessful achievement of operating the company. He concluded 
that the financial position and growtn of the co11pany must receive 
great attention by management if the stockholders' interests ar e to be 
best served . 
An interesting vie~v on this ,;uestion \vas expressed by an 
official of a company that has experienced a very rapid grm·1th during 
the last decade . 
As to question 2 - it is obvious that the long-range 
interests of permanent stockholders are tlle same as 
those of the company. The short-term speculative 
stockholder is the one Hho usually makes the most 
noise and he is entitled to no consideration. He 
has bought a pari-mutuel ticket - he doesn't o\vn the 
'i.1orse . 
Altnough 78% of the replies indicated that the primary responsi -
bility of management is to the stockholders , there is at least some doubt 
as to whether tlle results represent their true feelings . The comments 
demonstrate that several of the respondents se~ little or no difference 
between the interests of the corporation and the interests of the stock -
holders, although these comments cannot be properly said to apply to all 
of the respondents. 
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\.fnile there may be considerable lo__,ic to the vie~·7point tnat 
the interests of the stoclholders and the interests of the corporation 
are indist~nguis.1able, it would seem that suc~1 an attitude could encourage 
management to palliate inadequate dividend pa~nents. Thus manaeernent 
might attempt to justify a lmv dividend payout on the grounds t~wt it wi ll 
benefit stock~1olders in the long run by promoting gro-v1tn of earnings 
and dividends. On the other hand , stockholders might prefer to receive 
higher current dividends . Thus the hypothesis has been advanced that: 
Given the market preference as bet•-1een high irnmed ~ ate 
dividends and a high rate of gro-v1th in t .Le di~idend, 
corporations retain too much of their incone. b 
Stockholoer Voting on Dividend Policy 
Perhaps, then, it would be desirable to al1mv stockholders to 
determine for themselves v1hat is to t '.leir best interests in dividend 
matter s . 
The t hird ques tion asked of the executive \vas : 
r-ould you approve of 'lllo-v1ing com:non stocknolders 
to vote on matters of dividend policy? 
As might be expected, not one affirmat i ve answer to tnis quest~on -1as 
received. The result \vas due in part to tne .vagueness of t~1c questjon . 
The emphasis \·laS intended to be on the \·lOrd policy, and it was not in-
tended that the ques tion should be interpreted as extend)ng to vot~ng 
on amounts or frequency of individual dividend payments . It Has ratner 
concerned \vith \·lhether management ~vould accept the idea of stockholders 
deteruining for themselves . their preferences as to ,,table or fluctuating 
dividends, stock dividends, reinvestraent of earnings, and other matters 
54 ... 
of dividend policy . However, even if this point had been made clearer 
in the questionnaire, it is doubtful that the ansv1ers \vould have been 
materially different. Apparently these directors have no intention of 
surrendering this function. 
Most of the respondents based their negative answers to tais 
ques tion on the fact that stockholders delegate t his power to the board 
of directors. In addition, four of the respondents pointed out that 
such a plan \vould be quite impractical due to the large size of t 1 eir 
corporations . Four execu t ives claimed that stockholders are insufficiently 
informed to be in a position to pass judgment intelligently on such matters, 
and are not close enough to the operations of the busihess t o do so . 
An executive of a metal products company based his ans-.;Jer on 
tne fact t hat the size of large companies precludes tne possibility of 
stockholders voting on dividend policy . A senior vice - president in 
charge of finance and accounting of a large oil company expressed this 
opinion: 
You \vill note t ha t my ans\ver to ruestion 3 related to 
stockholders' voting on dividend policy was negatiye . 
This is because I believe t hat the stockholders do vote, 
although qui te indirectly, on dividend policy through 
their selection of directors . The s tockholders are not 
generally in a position to have available or to comprei1end all 
of the factors \·lhi ch mus t be given consideration in the 
determination of dividend policy . Their votes \vould be 
more likely to reflect their mvn personal position, ratner 
than t he over-all position of all stockholders and the 
general \vell - being of the company. 
One execu t 3ve indicated that management and the board of 
director s should keep themselves a\vare of stockholders' \vishes in all 
matters, including dividends . Another stated : 
Naturally, tne Board of ~irectors and Manage.nect of any 
company would like to receive the tninking of it.; stock -
holders as to divider.d policies . In a cloaely neld 
company, \vherein stocknolders may have sufficient knm,,lcclge 
of the plans and the financial pos:'.tion of t1e DutiLwss, 
tnen t.1ey might be able to cast a vote Hhict1 ,.;rould not be 
cietrimental to tne company 1 s interest . Unfort .. mately, most 
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of the stocknolders , especially investors in lar;e bus·'ne;:;scs, 
Go not .Hve clo.;;e Horking Knowleo.:;e and t.1erefore would lLOt 
be able to decide as to t .e best ~iviC:eml policy ott1er tl1an in a 
mo.;t &eneral manner . 
T-lvo re;,pondents said t11ey believe that stockholders nave no nee(. to vote 
on dividend matter.:; as t·1ey are free to express ttleir clcsi.rc~> .?.t annual 
meetings . Another executive commented as follmvs : 
Tne stocki10lders elect board nember"', and tney in turn elect 
managenent to carefully study the affairs of the corporation 
and make decisions regarding dividend polic} as tue result 
of ttleir "'er~ous st·.1dy . I do not tnink th<?t stock .• olders 
with lesser knowled;e are cmJpetent to pass 1pon dividena 
polic}. If the ~tockholders contirue di.;s~tiofied w~th 
r:1anagement 1 s decL.ions, they can of course c1.ange the t.lanage-
ment. 
The idea t:1at ttle average .;tockholdcr can cnange the "1an'1gement 
of a lar "'e corpor.<~tion seems ratner unrealistic . Certain ly tt1ere are 
fe'v stockt1olders wittl t11e funds, time, or interest to initiate .., proxy 
fight Hith a uell-intrencned m:magemcnt. As Living.ton .;;<~~s, the lar~e, 
pm-1erful share 10luers in z corporation are very 2.pt to b~ the e~~ecut:i.ves, 
members of t-w managerial group rather than t.1e stock.1olde1· ._;roup . For 
,nost stockholders, dividends are mainly a supplemer.t to tneir salaries . 
People are ~ob-holclers first , stockholders seco.1d . Tr1e ind:viduals Hho 
should be aost intere~ted in dividends are generally tue least aole to 
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'<v<ltcn over t.te affair.;; of the corporation. Livingston conclude.3 tnat a 
proxy is of little value to dost individuaL,, but tnat ti1e threat to 
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management of a Robert Young or Louis Holfson is a boon to all :::.:1are-
holuers . Such men tend to keep managenent from becoming too co.nplacent 
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in their treatment of stockholders . 
In surrrrnary the respondents indicated that while t .1ey ure cog -
nizant of the stockholders' interests in the dividenri policies, t1ey 
clai1n that they do not believe stockL1olders are ••ell enoug:1 informed or 
\vell enou_;h Cjualified to make decisions on dividend policy. They also 
state that it 'l.vould be impractical due to the large size of their corpor-
ations. Furthermore, they say that stockholders do vote by the election 
of directors and by the purchase and sale of stock . 
SuTIUUary of Payout Policies and Stockholder-11anagement Relat ons 
In this chapter it \vas found that the majority of executives of 
t he corporations in this survey claimed to approve of stating their clivi-
dend policies to stocknolder s . There is evidence that this is seldom 
done in actual practice, seeming to imply that many executives do not in 
reality desire to state their dividend policies because of the burden 
this might place on them to a dhere to these policies. Nonetheless , the 
broadening ownersnip of our large corporations by small investors points 
to the desir ability of doing so , even if only in general terms. 
It \vas also found that the majori ty of re.>pondent::; clai.n to 
believe that t l1e primary responsibility of management is to the stock -
holders rather t han the corporation as a separate entity in itself . On 
the other hand , tpe comments snmv that some executives do not discern 
any real difference between the interests of the stockholders and the in-
terests of t he corporation . The implication seems to be that these 
executives hold some'l.·lha t of a paternalistic attitude tm·mrd the stock-
'.)7. 
holders, supporting the vie\-J of Graham and Dodd that many corporations 
believe 'whatever is good for the businesa mu->t be good for the stock-
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holders . ' 
The third question demonstrated that these companies are un-
animously opposed to allowing stockholders to vote on matters of dividend 
policy for several reasons . Perhaps it should be pointed out tt1at the 
author does not advocate seriously that stockholders vote on dividend 
matters but tnere does seem to be an implication that the position of 
these executives \vould be stronger if they Here to make a conscientious 
effort to state their payout policies . Hhile the past record of a com-
pany provides some evidence of what its dividend policies are an occasion-
al definition of t hese policies by management would be of considerable 
value to investors and stockho~ders . B} so doing , s tockholders \lOuld 
be in a better position to evaluate the suitability of a particular com-
pany to their investment goals, thereby negating any need for voting on 
company policies . If a company \vere committed to reinvesting a large 
part of its earnings, an investor requiring dividend income v10uld be put 
on notice to invest his funds else\olhere. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PAYOUT POLICIES AND FINANCIAL PLANNING 
In the preceding chapter it is found that the majority of the 
executives surveyed express the belief that their primary responsibility 
is to the stockholders in all matters affecting t11e corporation. If 
this is true, it would seem that the desires of stockholders snould be 
of major importance in the formulation of their dividend policies . 
\~ith this in mind, certain questions regarding dividends and financial 
planning are raised . 
1hat is the relat ive importance of various factors that affect 
dividend policies? Are the stockholders' needs the primary consideration 
in dividenu decisions? Does maintenance of the dividend play a ·najor 
role in financial planning? ~[here it is deemed desirable to retain 
earnings for expansion or other purposes, does management consider stock 
dividends a suitable substitute for cash dividends? Furtllermore, wha t 
is the relation of payout ratios to equity financing? 
The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to determine tne 
anS\\Iers to tne above questions '1\lith respect to tne companies in this sur-
vey . The final three questions of the questionnaire, Table XI in the 
Appen~ix, form the basis of the research in tnis chapter. It a.1ould be 
pointed out once again, hm\lever , that the sample was not randomly sel-
ected . Furthermore, ti1e possibility of bias in t~1e respondents' ansv1ers 
should not be overlooked. 
Factors Affecting Dividend Policy 
The fourth question requested the respondents to rank in order 
of importance a list of six factors that might affect L1e dividend 
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policies of their companies. A ranking of 1 equals tne most important, 
a ranking of 2 t he next in importance, etc. In tabulating the results, 
found in Table XIII in the Appendix, the number of 1 ratings :Cor each 
factor was multiplied by six, the number of 2 r atings by five, and so on 
for the .six factors. These \veigh ted results Here totaled i ' order to 
find the order of importance the companies place on these factors for the 
most part . The unequal number of ansv1ers is due to ti1e fact t i1at all 
respondents did not rank all of the factors. In Table Alii the results 
are str atified by class of stock; grmvt h , income and cyclical. Inspec -
tion of this table shows no appreciable difference in the results between 
the three classes . Therefore, Table V, page 63 is a condensed tabulation 
of the results. The survey also shows that no single factor appears to 
dominate the dividend decisions of the respondents as a group . This 
variability is a reflection of the different conditions extant betHeen 
companies and induGtries . 
Lintner found that current earnings and the previouJ year's 
dividend \vere by far the most important factors in determinint.; the amount 
of the current year's dividends in the companies he studied . In a 
correlation analysis of data for the period 1916-1951, ~e fourd an ad-
_;u.,ted multiple correlation coefficient of 0.993 by linearly relating re-
tained earnings to current profits after taxes and tne previous year's 
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dividend payments. ~ith regard to Lintner's findings, no~ever, 
Dobrovolsky has made the follmving observation: 
Nr . Lintner's concluding statement that current profits 
and the preceding year's dividend are the two principal 
factors determining current retention is c~sentially in 
agreement with my ovm findings . Hmvever, I v10uld not 
exclude other variables as resolutely as he does. The 
rate of current investment re~uirements (for plant ex-
pansion and so on) appears to be a significant factor.41 
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Thus ti·TO authorities have found tl1at current earnings and the 
previous year's dividend ar e tne most i-,portant factors affectin.:; the 
current dividend policy . Hhat , then, are the results of the author's 
survey? 
Tne top score was raade by 'casu position and workin'"' cap:!.tal 
re 'tuiremen t . Approximately 79% of the respondent:> ranked this factor as 
either first or second in importance in affectine ti1e dividend decisions 
of t heir companies . The 11eighted rank, in Table V, is 339 . 
I t is true that dividends may be declared out of prior year's 
earnings , but they mus t be paid out in cash . 1n1ile this serves to ex-
p l ain the high rating given this factor by the majority of tne re.;pond -
ents , it also impl.;es that companies tailor the ir dividends to conform 
with the cash position of the business . This implication is contrary 
to the findings of the Lintner survey. For t he conpanies he studied, 
financial planning and capital budgeting ivere undertaken ivitn the purpose 
of adhering to dividend policie3 . In other ivords , tne dividend policy 
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was the cause and tne financial planning the effect . 
Ther e is some difficulty in explaining the difference in t.1e 
finding:; . A partial explanation may be the difference in the sar.1ples 
and the difference in methods of investigatio'1. . The s tudy by Lintner 
was in considerable depth and was quite penetrating . His findin;s were 
a result of extensive interviews with several executives in each firm . 
'1-J"ith this in r.1ind , per t1aps the tHo findings can be reconciled . \!hile it 
is obvious that dividends and financial planning are closely related, it 
is ratner obscure as to which is the cause and which is tlle effect . The 
present surve) iv:ts relatively .;uperficial i·lhereas t~1e Lintner .;urvey i'ms 
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nore probin:; . The latter study appears to have evinceJ the subtlety of 
the relationship, indicating that financial planning tends to be based 
upon the dividend . 
According to the weighted results, :current net earnines rank 
second in ~ ·nportance in affecting the dividend policies of t11ese co1.1panies. 
Approxioately 68% of t'i1e respondents ranked this factor as fir~t or 
second in importance, and over 40% of the co;npanies ranked it fir;;t . 
The to t al weighted rank fo r this factor '"·'lS .J27. 
One executive \lilO ranked earnings as the primary factor in 
determining dividend polic}, pointed out that his company had paid no 
dividends for several years . Another commented as follO\vS: 
l~ consider that the first and foremost aspect of our 
policy is tt1e ability to pa) a dividend . Tims, ear."'ings 
become the first essential . 
Lintner and Dobrovolsky r.ound ti.1at current earning..; and the 
previous year's dividend were the most important factors affecting the 
current year's dividend, whereas the present survey shows that current 
earnings are of less importance than the cas~ position. T11e .. L fference 
in results could be explained by a selection bias or phras:n~ of the 
question . It is possible t!1at the companies in the autllor'..; sanple tend 
to subordinate t.1e importance of current earnings as a re..;ult of a policy 
of regular and stable dividend payments . At any rate, tdc resultJ appear 
to be inconclusive and suggest the desirability of furtaer study . 
Expansion plans or other proj ects reCj_uirin(; laq_,e capital e"-
penditures ranked th i rd in importance accorGin:; to t~1e \-1eig~1tcd results. 
About j7% of tne re 1 on 1ts ranked this factor as first or ;econd in 
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import'lnce . The '·Jeig,lted rank, Table V, is 27-.J. 
Capital expenditure:>, and uorking capital re t;uirements, arc 
closely related and pertwps it ~·muld have been better to .uve combined 
these tHo f1.ctors . At any rate, the results indicate that ca..;n po~ition, 
'"orl~ing capital recu ire ,aent..;, expansion plans, and projects re r.uiring 
large capital expenditures, wnich are all interdependent to a certain 
extent, exer t the greatest influence on t~e dividend policic~ of t~c~e 
companies . 
Jtability or lack of stability of earnings w1.s listed as 
first in importance by only nine of the respondents, but its l ar~c number 
of second, third, and fourt~1 pl'lce votes demonstra t es tnat this is a 
major factor for many of the companies in this survey . The stability 
or lack of stability of earnings is inportant of cour~e in its relation 
to the emphasis placed on stability and regularity of dividend payments . 
The sub:;tantial ranking given this factor tends to support tne findings 
of two otner studies . The 'veighted rank , Table V, is 256 . 
Fifty- seven per cent of the conpanies que:.>tioned in a survey 
of corporate dividend.policies by Narshall and Tnompson :.>tated that they 
att~~t to pay out a more or less fixed percentage of each year's earn-
ings . Several had the policy of averaging out dividends .paid over a 
period of years at a certain percentage of the expected earnings for tne 
period . Others merely maintained dividend payouts at a con..;ervative 
level so that stability could be acnieved despite the fluctuations in 
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earnings . 
Lintner also found that the conpanies he studied place consider-
able empi1asis on this factor . Furthermore, he found that the companies 
Table V. Relative I Qportance of Factors 
Affecting Dividend Policien 
Factor 
Cas .1 pos::.tion and \oJOr king capital 
posit::.on 
Expansion plans or other projects re -
quiring large capital expenditures 
Current net earnings 
Stability or l!i~ck of stability of 
earnings 
Stockholders' preferences fo r divi -
aer.ds or reinvestment of earnings 
Use or non-use of external financing 
Heigh ted 
Rank 
339 
27.J 
'J27 
236 
118 
123 
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change t he dividend only by part of the amount indicated by the current 
financial fi~1re$ . Otherwi~e , on reacaing a new plateau of earnin0 J , 
only a part of these neu ear nings are passed on to t~te stoc:-.!Ol. .... ers at 
any one period . Ratner, t he dividends are gradually adjusted upward 
over a period of one or t\vo year s in order to reflect the chan8e in earn-
ings in a gr adual , conservative manner . The same held true for decreased 
levels of earnin~~ , the dividend being re~ ced by less than the drop in 
4 1f 
earnings indicated. 
The importance of maintaining a stable dividend \vas explained 
in these tvords by an execut~ve of an oil co:.:pany : 
I t seems to .ne that, \-lit:l the constantly broadening 
mmership of Amer ican indu t try by t .. le accumulation 
of savin6 .> av~ilable for investr11ent in t1.1e h3.nds of 
millions of neu individual inves tors, the dividend 
policJ tnuJt give consideration to tnis f'lctor . The 
same app l ies to &ome extent to the accumulation of 
share ... i'l the hands of institutional investors \v11ere 
the instituion is providins an income to thousands 
of individuals t .. trou 0 .1 the mana.;ement of its invest -
ments and trust funds . not 1 of these grmving develop -
ments nay Hell indicate the 'es~rability of a relativclJ 
stable dividend rate ,.,hich groHs periodically as the 
earning poHer of the comp 'lny ...,rm-1s . Thi:; is in con-
trast to ~ policy ~~ica provides for variations in 
dividend rate w tn cyclical variations in earnings or 
:;ubstantial year-end extras in &oo~ years ~1icl1 arc 
omitted in poorer years . 
" . 
A lou ratine; was given to ' stockholders' preference for divi -
dends or reinvestment of earnings by the majority of t.tese compnnie .... 
Approxi .1atcly 75'lo of the reppondents ranked this factor as fifth or 
sixth in importance in its effect on the dividend policy, 'e...,pite the 
fact that dividends, along with r~rket price appreciation are the only 
tangible gains to be derived from a conunon stocl-. investment. 
One re..;pondent cue stioned hm·1 t he stocknolders' preference..., 
could be de termined in a large corporation. Admittedly this is diffi -
cult , but one authority believes that the collection of statistical in-
formation by companies that \vould classify the present stocki10lders 
. ... 
4..J 
\·lOuld be helpful in formulating dividend policie.;. Another advocates 
analysis of stockholder lists and st<tte s that at least one company ,.,as 
aided in determining :i.ts p'lyout ratio through intervie•·lin.., ttocl,,10lders 
'!·6 
\-lho had held ..:;tock the longest . 
Hhile stocb10lders' preferences received a lm-1 ranking on the 
Hnole, three of the corporate ofticials ra'"lkeci this as the num0er one 
factor in dividend decisions . One respondent stated that the importance 
of this factor depend5 in part on the size of the corporation: 
My ansHer to yoLir uestion primarily relates to the 
lar6 c co .1pany ,.,hose shares are Hid .... ly distributed 
a.1on[, . tt1ousands of m·mcrs, includin6 individuals 
and inst tutions . It is obviou::> that the 3an~:; 
response •muld not appl) to a co."'lpany whose O\mer-
s'ilip Has concentratec in a. smaller number of stock-
holders \vhere the dividend policy might \vell be a 
reflection of t heir pers onal requirements for incone 
and other matters. 
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An official of a metals company stated that dividends should depend on 
the dividend policies follmved by a company in the past . 
One should not suddenly change a dividend policy 
because the people t'l11o have bought the stock are 
either looking for a groHt company or a company 
that pays out a large propo1;tion in dividends. 
For instance, our particular company in the past 
has paid out approximately 50% in dividends I 
think this is a good policy, and we would like to 
maintain it. Of course our earnings don t allmv 
us to pa) out exactly 50%, as \ve always like to 
keep our dividend rate the same , if poss::.ble, 1:1ainly 
becau::;e among o•1r j •00 stockholders, most of them 
are retired people, so tve have an obligation to t hem . 
The above statement is in great contrast to the co~nent by t~e respond -
ent of a drugs firm that said, 'I don't knotv (or care) .vi1at our stock -
1.olders preference may be .. , It appears that ne is suggesting that 
stock1olders are free to sell their shares if t hey are dissatisfied 
with the policies of the coupany, and t ha t he believes t~le comp2.ny 
s1ould be operated without regard to the effects of variouJ policies on 
the s tockholders . According to Hunt, such attitudes of aloofness lead 
47 
to unsatisfactory stockholder relations . 
The 'use or non-use of external financin~' was t 1e la~t factor 
rated aa to its effect on dividend policy. Grahan and T)odd ::,clicve 
that corporations rely too heavil y on retained earnings for c~pital 
f mds. Ti1ey state t~1at t he dividend policy sL1ould depend on t~1c earning 
power and intrinsic value of the s tock, rather than the ''arbitrarily 
determined needs of the businc~s. Legitimate needs of a corporation 
for additional funds s1ould be financed by the sale of additional sec-
t+( 
uri ties. 
l{..iile Graham and Dodd declare that corporation., a.10ulC: make 
greater use of external financing, Dobrovolsky fou,1d that corpor..,tions 
generally increased their use of both internal and external funds during 
periods of corporate expansion, with a tendency for external funds to be 
of greater relative importance at higher than at lower expansion rates . 
Furthermore, companies with high expansion rates depended more :1eavily 
/+9 
on external financing tnan companies \-lith lmv expansion rates. 
Trlis factor ranked relatively lm; among t he factors affecting 
dividend policies . Eighty per cent of the re;..ponaents rankeci this 
factor as fifth or sixth in iinportance, and only t•vo gave it a top rank-
ing. Only one respondent conunented to t.le effect that ci.iviclcnd and ex -
pansion policies should be sucn as to seek a balance bet\<'een retention 
of earnings and borrowed funds so that a reasonable, consistent payout is 
r.1aintained . 
Ti1e fifth question asked of the executives \~as: 
Does maintenance of the diviaend play a major part 
in the financial planning of your company? 
Lintner found that for the companies he studied, lucrative opportunities 
for additional reinvestment of earnings often ••ere pas3ed up if by so 
doing the companies \muld be unable to adhere to the dividend policy . 
He concluded: 
On the basis of our work so far, at least, the 
essential explanation see"$ to be simpl) that 
investment outlays nave over long periods been 
quite consistently and highly correlated with current 
profits, sales volume , and internal fund flows, and 
that allmvances for these relationships in past ex-
periences has been built into the dividend policies of 
corporations in such a w~y that corporations can pay 
the dividends implied oy these policies v.rith cons.; -'er-
able consistency over lon6 periods of time, and do so 
(in the light of the rest of their plannin~) wit1 con-
~iderable comfort and ease . jO 
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Approximately 80% of the respondents replied in the affir,native 
to this ctuestion tending to support Lintner's conclusion that :nanagements 
focus their financial planning around the dividend rather than deterniuing 
dividends in accordance witn their financial needs . The extent to ,.,hich 
these co~panies place maintenance of the dividend above other consider-
ations cannot be determined from the replies to t ,1is ctuestion . 
Hhile not mentioned in the questionnaire, tax considerations, 
as a result of double taxation, first on corporate profits and secondly 
on personal incomes, play a large part in determining the payout ratios of 
many companies. It has been \·Jritten that dividend policy is a t.ulttcr of 
stockaolder relations in lar:;e, broadly owned coP1panies, but a matter 
)1 
of tax considerations in smaller, .aore closely held co;npanies. The 
co.npanies in this survey \vere sufficiently large and broat ly ouncd to 
be listed on the New York Stock Exchange . Ti1ere i:; little c.o\l.Jt but that 
this explains the negligible emphasis on tax cons . derations in the res -
pondents' coJ~ents . 
Stock Dividends 
~\'hen the financial planning of a corporation pointe to a need 
for additional capital, retention of earnings ma) accomplistl t.lL; , but also 
may result in a payout ratio so lmv as to provide stocknolders \vith an 
inadequate return on their investment . In such caseJ, Graham and Dodd 
lH.. • 
recorrunend the payment of stock dividends \-lhich would give stockholders 
current " tangible evidence of their ounership of these reinvested profits . 
If the stocknolder st10uld prefer cash, he could of course sell ni. .. stock 
dividend shares . 
Because of the close relations1ip of stock dividends to payout 
ratios and financial planning, the following question was asked of the 
executives : 
Do you believe that stock dividends are a satisfactory 
substitute for cash dividends over an extended periou · 
of time? 
Tt1e results of the questionnaire \-lith regard to this last question \·7ere 
ovenvhelmingly again.>t the substitution of stock dividends for cash clivi-
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dends. Only tHo of the respondents ansuered this question in the affirmative. 
Eighteen of the executives, l10wever, sa\v fit to ctualify their anS\olers . One 
stated that stock dividends are satisfactory 'if not continued for too long 
a period of time . ' The others were more explicit in designating situations 
where they believe stock dividends are satisfactory . 
The majority of the connnents \·Jere to the effect that stock divi-
dends are satisfactory where a company is experiencing rapid gro\vth and 
must conserve cash . For example, an execu tive o f a r apid l y gr owing elec-
tronics firm t hat has declared s tock dividends in t he past stated : 
Conditions vary . Often it is better to give a stock 
dividend, especially when the stockholders' equity 
has increased, and additional funds are needed for 
capital . 
One respondent suggested that in case of grm-1th c01npanies or 
very clo.;ely held companies, capital might be used to best advantage by 
09 . 
retention of all of the earnings . Tne substitution of stock dividends 
for cash dividends in such cases \vould alleviate tn .... need for <1 ;;reat 
deal of outside financing throu0 h debt or sale of equity, \vhich he believes 
cause great dilution and are a high cost of capital. 
In 85% of the cases studied by Barker, however, cash saving 
was not accoMplis~ed by the declaration of stock dividends. !Ie stated t~1at 
cash is not conserved if the cash dividend rate is not reduced by the amount 
of the stock dilution factor brought about by the increase in t.1e number 
of shares outstanding . In other words, the increase in the number of 
shares will increase the outflow of cash unless the dividend rate is de -
creased . The total payments on the neH number of .:>hares ::;t1oulC: be equal 
to or less than the total payments on the old number of shares in order 
to effect a cash saving . Furtnermore, if the rate per 
the market price of the stock is likely to be affected 
snare is red~ced, 
SJ 
adversely . 
One respondent indicated that stockholders' preferences and 
growth needs for reinvestment are the ,nost important factors in stock divi-
dend decisions . He stated that a company should pay cash dividends i.E 
the majority of stockholders \vant them and if this can be accomplished 
without additional financing . Another thought that stock dividends are a 
satisfactory substitute for special or year - end extra cas:1 dividends, if 
these dividends are justified by high earnings and provided substantial 
sums are spent on expansion of production facilities. One executive made 
the follov1ing comment : 
Rapidly .,rm.;ring businesses requ1.r1.ng •. aaximum reinvestment 
may rely on rewarding investors through capital ~ain -
the investor may prefer capital gain to cash income . 
Hence tne ans\ver depends on the nature of the bu.;iness and 
the re uirements of the investors . 
Hany investors in hi:;h tax br.:1ckets are enthusiastic tmvard 
stock dividends because they are taxed as capital gains if sold , Htlereas 
cash dividends are taxed as ordinary incou1e . An official of ~n oil com-
pany stated: 
Dividend policies st1ould not attempt to appeal to all 
clas.;es of stocktlolders . Some are higi1 tax bracket 
and prefer stock dividends . Otners may prefer li 0 h 
cash yield . 
However, Barker claims that there is no tax benefit to be derived from 
the sale of stock dividends. He argues tnat proceeds of a s.:1le would be 
taxed as a capital gain 'vhether the sale had been of stock dividend shares 
or the ori£,inal sh~res . At the same time, cash dividends paid on stock 
dividend shares are taxed as ordinary income the same as cas.1 dividends paid 
on t~e oriJinal snares . Actually a stock~older could accomplish the same 
result by selling a portion of his origina l holdings witnout the bother of 
the corapany paying stock dividends . 
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corporation would be reduced . 
In either case, his equity in the 
Hyers and Heath emphasize the annoyance of fractional shares to 
small stockholders as a result of stock dividends, and point out the diffi -
_j~ 
culties in tax co,nputations if stock dividends are .Jold. The chair.nan 
of the board of one corporation based his dislike for stock div~dcnds on 
t.1e same grounds: 
I think tl11t stock dividends are a sort of nuisance to 
stock~olders, rc ~iring excessive accountin~ in connection 
uith the establi~hment of the tax value of the securit~es, 
anc. that t'le) are a particular nuisance to b2.nks and tru::;t 
co •. 'lpanies .nanaging estate:> . It :Ls ahm)::; diffj_c•Jlt to 
Lnm1 Hhether stock dividends should be s oL:i anc. t~lC proceed., 
paiC.: out to the life interest, or \vhet.1Cr t11ey s.1o..1ld be 
retainea cs part of t11e c.:1pital of the tru ..... t. I t 11inl~ 
.:!lso that to the ereat majority of people ...;tocl~ divi-
dcnds are confu::;ins and dis::;cmbling . If they arc p~i , . 
in lieu of cash dividend.; ~vhich are earned, :.n order to 
conserve t 1c cash for the company, there i::> so1~1e argument 
for the 11, t.1o·u:; .1 even then they are sone\vhat confusins. 
~lhen a corpora t ion pays a stock dividend i n lieu of a 
cas u divicend , it is 1aer ely saying to its stock.10lders, 
'Tnis will enable you to dispose conveniently of a 
portion of your capital ancl. u.>e it as if it were current 
income . · I v10uld not go so far as to ::>ay that tne pay-
ment of stock 0ividcnds is deceptive, thou_:;h I do believe 
that at times t 1ey -'ire so dissembling as to be confunin'"' . 
l:hilc it ::.s true that stoc~.:: dividends result in .. 1ore ..;.1a:-ce..> 
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out::>tanding, and generally result in the groHth of t~1e nu,1ber o;: .Jl1are:10ldcr.>, 
at least one authority does not favor them for this purpose . 
that ti1ose companie:; in his study that did not increase t:-:.eir ca.;,1 divi-
derd a long "ith the .;tock dividend actually suffereci 1. decline in their 
number of Silare.lOlders . He concluded that if a corporation ~esires to 
broaden its base of otmership, it iG more :>atisfactory to effect c stoc:, 
J6 
split than to declare stock divide~ds . Ttle opinion of one e::ccL'tive 
ten~::; to agree wit~ his conclusion. 
I personally don't see much advantage to stocl~ dividcn6..>. 
vnlen all is said and done , all you are doinv is p11ttin[ 
r!lore share .:i out, and usually the increase ir t 11e 'mmber 
of shares from a stock dividend is rather minor . I 
believe that a stock should not be uortLl more t .•. n, S-'l.f , 
$100 on the market, and ti1at if the value of a stoc1~ i..; 
built up to an ahlount around -, 7-', serious consideration 
should be given to the possibility of a split to briag 
t.le value clmvn . In tl1is uay you enable aore people to 
bu ) your s:1ares >vitnont having to pay excessive orokerage 
:Cees . I think the continual issue of stock dividends, 
like some co_;npanies have done, is an exces..;ive cost in 
paper \vorl' . 
The results of the survey indicate that t~e respondents are 
opposed to the declaration of stock dividends except in special circum-
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Furthen1ore, the studies of Barker and Hyers and Heath imply 
ti1at stock dividends are of questionable value in the financial planniag 
of a corporation . Perhaps a higher cash pa:you t co:nbined vli t~1 e:;~ternal 
financing -vmuld be more equitable and satisf actory to stocklwlders tllan 
stock dividends . 
Payout Ratios and Equity Financing 
According to Loeb, many authorities believe that ~cnerous pay-
out ratios facilitate the sale of new stock by improving a corporation's 
':J7 
financial standing and by enhancing the market price of the stoc~ . 
During the l9lf0 1 s , much of tne expansion of American corporntions \vas fin-
anced throu 5 a t~e retent1on ot earnings, whica resulted in relatively low 
payout ratios . 11any corporations did not wish to sell additional cmmnon 
stock in ~·lllat vJas generally considered an unfavorable market . Ti1ere is 
reason to believe , hm..-rever, that sale of common stocl~ at e~uitablc prices 
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would have been possible if dividends had been cormnensurate \Jiti.1 earnings . 
Sheehan states that management cannot ignore the continuity and 
stability of dividends since they r.1Ust come to the raarket occasionally 
.J9 
for funds . Guthmann and Dougall declare that it is desirable to main-
tain regular dividends as they enhance the general credit of a corporation. 
Although the survey did not a s k questions concerning the relation 
of payout to equity financing , t\W executives cormuented on t~1is aspect of 
dividend policy . The chairman of a grm..-rth company lent support to tlle 
importance of dividends in the financial planning of a company with the 
following cormnent: 
For a groHing , developing company which ma:y have need 
of additional capital to finance its groHth, nothing 
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is very much more important than its 0 e·1eral credit 
rating to enable it to finance its future needs . 
A good credit rat ing will enable the co,.1pany to secure 
additional capital either through the sale of cor.ur:on 
stock or preferred stock, or through lon3-term debt . 
To insure a favorable credit rating, it may at times 
be desi.rable to continue the payment of dividends \vnen 
they might not otherwise be warranted . 
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A COITrr'lent by another executive also supported this view : 
Dividend policy has an Lnportant influence on financial 
plannin0 , not only in affecting the amount of retained 
earnings available for expansion of the bu~ineJs, but 
more importantly in affecting the character and strength 
of equity m·mership '"hich provides a base for nmv financing . 
Tne beneficial effect of stability and continuity of ~ividend~ 
on financing is illustrated by the Public Utility Indu~try . TilC public 
utility vie\vpoint tmvard stock 10lders relations and equity financing was 
ably expressed by \.' .F . 3tanley in 19:50 . The tnesis of his article was 
that the key to good stockholder -manage~ent relations is to be fo~nd in 
the attitudes of 1:1anagement toward dividends and the :narket price of their 
stock . Above everything else, common stockholders appear to desire income 
on their investment . Tnis often has been neglected, accorGins to 3tanley, 
because companies have needed cash for financing . He pointed out that 
public utilities have financed at low cost '"ith co.n•1on stocl< as a result, 
in large part, of their liberal dividends . He stated that, generally , 
corporations have financea their cash needs through retention of earnings, 
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and consequently have sold at low price-earnin5 s ratioJ . 
Public utilities, i10tvever, possess certain ciwracteristics that pro note 
stability and require external financing . Public utilitie,; have capital 
requirements ~1hich are too large to be financed through the retention of 
]L; . 
u2 
earnings, and consequently 1:rust raise funds fro,n external sources . The 
nature of utilities 1 operat10n9, providing an essential service to both 
consumers and industry , promotes stability of operations, anc ti.1rough 
government resulation, public utilities operate as monopolies in ~he area 
tney serve. Further1ore, the courts have generally held that a utility 
company is entitled to earn a fair return o~ the fair value of its prop -
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erty used in ~ervicing the public . These cnaracteristics ~erve to 
prO't10te stability of earnings and dividends. 
Hov1ever , it is clear that a ~ l inciustrie ~ are not olessed vlith 
these characteristics . Certain consumer goods industries enjoy stability 
of earnin.;s, but industrial companies generally are affected b) the flue -
tuations of business cycles to such a degree as to prevent them from 
maintaining high payout ratios for extended periods of time . Ti1Us, \vhi le 
the beneficial effects of nign payout ratios on stocktwlder relations and 
equity financing are well established, conpanies are generally limite~ by 
the characteristics of their industry as to the pos~ibilities of following 
such policy . 
.:>ummary of Payout Policies and Financial Planning. 
Capital fund requirements c~nbined with current earnings appear 
to exert the greatest influenc e on the dividend decisions of the companies 
i n this study . On the other hand, stock':wlders 1 preferences and the ex -
tent of external financing seetn to be relatively unimportant in affecting 
the dividend policies of these companies. The results iwply, L1en, ti1at 
these companies subordinate tne needs of the stocknoldcrs to the need"' of 
the business . A further implication is tL1a t nigher payout r atios mig:1t 
be possible if greater use of external sources of funds were made . 
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It Has also found in this chapter that maintenance of the divi-
dend plays a major role in the financial planning of the majority of 
these companie9, indicating that t11ey attempt to follmv a regular and 
stable dividend policy . This tends to support the findings of Lintner 
and Dobrovolsky that the previous year's dividend is a major factor in 
determining current dividends . 
The respondents to the questionnaire are overwhelmingly opposed 
to the continual use of stock dividends as a substitute for cash in the 
dividend payout of corporations. On the other hand, the comments indi-
cate that they are satisfactory in cases of rapid grmvth and where stock-
holders desire them. To the author this implies that corporations 
should attempt to determine stockholders' preferences ~vith more zeal than 
they apparently have in the past. If they should find that their stock-
holders are composed largely of \vealthy investors \>Iho prefer capital gains 
to current cash income , they \>Iould be justified in follmving a policy of 
substituting stock dividends for cash during phases of rapid expansion. 
However, if the stockholders depend on cash dividends to provide or aug-
ment their current income, a policy of declaring stock dividends might 
be undesirable . 
It nas been shown that in the case of public utilit) companies, 
equity financing is enhanced by stable and generous dividenc payout~ . 
Hhile it would appear that this would also apply to industrial corpor -
ations as \vell as public utilities, it should be emphasized that many 
companies and industries are not characterized by the stability of earn-
ings that permit high, regular dividend payments. A policy of paying a 
conservative, low dividend with special year-end extras in periods of 
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h.±gh earnings might be desirable for cyclical companies . To attempt to 
maintain a high payout through exter nal financing for these companies 
would be dangerous . The burden of excessive debt would be prohibitive 
in years of lm-1 earnings , and common stock financing would add to the bur -
den of dividend payments . Growth companies and stable companies, hmvever , 
should give consideration to the beneficial effect of a generous payout 
policy on stockholder rel~tions and their ability to raise equity capital . 
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CIUu>TER V 
SU:MHARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The L1ypothesis tnat only a lovi association exists 0etueen cor -
porate payout ratios on the one hand and corporate s,rowth and 1:1<1rket pr;ce 
appreciation of cor:tnon stock on the other, appears to be illu..>trated by 
the data in this stucy . The evidence is insuf ficient to prove the ypo -
thesis, •10\·lever , since t.1e samples were not se lected at rando~n . Thus i t 
is inpotisible to snow that there is generally a low association f or l arge 
corpora tions. Further research in this a rea would be necessar; .:.n order 
to prove the hypothes i s . 
For the companies studiea in this paper, nowever , there is only a 
slight association between the size of the dividend payatt ratLo and the 
extent of corporate growth as measured by the per cent increase in total 
assets , sales, earned surplus, earninss and divide~ds . It ~ccmJ apparent 
t.-wt other factors th.:m the level of t:1e payo'Jt rat· o must 'Je called upon 
to explain the corporate gr owtn of these companies oetv;een 1949 and 19)'-' · 
It i..; suf,gcstcd that t L1c primary factors that influence :,rm1th may be t.w 
~uality of raanagemcnt and the growth potential of the inC:uctry . 
The correlation be t \'leen payout ratios and market pr j.cc app-.:-eciation 
fo r the growt:1 stock sample is negligible . On the other hand, t.1e correlation 
fo r the income stock and cyclical stod:s is higher , but since the ::;a,nples 
are non-random no defini te conclusions can be reache~. T~e ~is~er corre-
lat ion could be a result of chance factors. 
rlitn respect to these samples ,, there appears to be a tendency for 
low-payout stocks to appreci~tc at a fas t er rate t han high-payout stocks 
during t~e ten-year period. It appears, ~1otvever, tnat lmv pajout ratios 
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are not a cause of corporate groHt!1 or market price appreciatio.,, althou:;h 
the presence of factors t.1at promo tc growth may encourage t,le adoption of 
a low payout policy by management . 
The relation betHeen payout ratios and pricc-earuings rat:~os 
for the stocks in this st·cty is negligible . On the other hand, one 
study has shmm that there is a direct relation bet1veen payout rat::.os and 
price-earnings ratios, otner things being equal . Thi~ variation in find-
ings is explained partly by the difference in data and .netl.10d of study . 
The stock;:; in the other study uere similar in all respects except payout, 
thereby red1cing the effects of other factors that might influence the 
level of the price - earnings ratio . The higher payout .,tacks consistently 
sold at higher price - earnings ratios . In the present study, no attempt 
'\vas made to compare stocks that \·lere similar in all re ... pects except pay-
out, and a very low correlation resulted. 
In this study, the correlations would probably be higner if 
atypical companies were eliminated from the samples . Even tnen, nmvever, 
due to L1e limitations of tile .3amples, it \vould be impossible to conclude 
that low payout ratios are generally associated witn corporate growth and 
market price. appreciation. 
There is no appreciable difference between the t~ree sa~ples 
of stocks with regard to the association of payout ratios with corporate 
growth and market price appreciation . The difference in performance 
bet1veen growth stocks and income stocks, hmvever , is very marked . The 
grm1tl1 stocks experienced far greater gains in corporate -:,rmvth and market 
price appreciation of the common stock . The mean payout of the grmvtl1 
stocks is only four percentage points_less than tne mean payout of the 
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income stocks . Therefore the difference in results cannot be explained 
by any fundamental difference in.payout ratios . As has been suggested 
above, the difference is undoubtedly due to other f~ctors, but there is 
no evidence in this data to indicate \vhat these factors are. 
The data indicate that there is no basis for estimating the 
market performance of these stocks from their dividend payouts. It 
would seem that factors other than the level of the payout ratio \vould 
be of far .::;reater value in attempting to appraise t11e future performance 
of a common stock . Nevertheless, the low- payout stocks appear to 
appreciate at a faster rate, and where other factors that enhance gro\vth 
are present, a low payout ratio might be considered a favorable sign for 
the future . It should be emphasized again, hmvever, that the data are 
insufficient to generalize for all corporations. 
Tt1e hypothesis that the needs and preferences of stockholders 
are subordinate to other factors \vhicil affect dividend policy and fin -
ancial planning appears to be illustrated by the data in this study. 
Hith such limited data, however, it is impossible to advance the nypo -
thesis as a generalization for all corporations . Furtnermore, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether or not tne replies to tile ..,_uestionnaire 
represent the true feelings of the respondents in all cases . Never the -
less, the results appear to support tne contention that stocknolders' 
needs are of secondary importance in tne formulation of dividend policies 
of the companies studied . 
The majority of tne respondents indicate tnat t i1e:• approve of 
stating dividend policies to their stockholders. Ncvertheleus, Graham 
and Dodd present evidence that this is not done generally by corporations 
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in actual practice. 
~1i1ile the majority of t he re.;ponde.lts indicate that tneir 
primary responcii:>ility i::; to the stockholc:cr.., rat.wr than tne corporation 
as a separate entity, t11erc is some doubt as to \vhether t:wy do indeed 
see any appreciable difference between the long-tero interests of the 
st0ckholders and the interects of the corporation. It Hould see.n t.1at 
many of these executives consider that stockholder:. are incapable of 
judging a:; to \vnat is in their best interests . 
T~1e executives in this curvey exhibit an ovcrw:1elrninf:, aver.;ion 
to allo~~ing stock~10lders to de termine ,.,hat the dividend policy of a cor-
poration should i:>e . Thus uhile the executives clair.1 that t.1e:.r primary 
responsibility is to the stockdolders, tney dOuld not allow the stoc~ ­
holders to vote on a raatter ~·lhich most directly affects their investment , 
namely the dividend polic~. 
Capital requirements cm:1bined wit.'l current net ear>:1inr;;.; are tne 
moct important factors in determining the dividend policie...: of these com-
panies. A factor of lc:;.; importance is the stability of earninss . 
~vnile the ma~ority of the re.:>pondents assert that maintenance of the divi-
dend is a major factor in the financial planning of t.1eir corporation ... , 
stockholders ' preferences receive relatively little consitieration in tde 
dividend and financi~l planning of these co~panics. The use or non-use 
of external financing qleo plays a minor role in the dividend and finan-
cial planning of the companies surveyed . 
T~e respondents are generally opposed to the substitution of 
stock dividends for cash dividends, except in cases \~ere low payout ratios 
are desired by manageraent in orC:er to finance exceptional invest:nent oppor-
tunities. Tni:;; ll7ould seem to imply that \·7here r.1anage1nent desires to re-
tain a large share of the earnines, stock dividends are considered by 
many of the respondents as a means of recognizing their responsibility 
to the stocki.1olders for the successful reinves t ment of tLle earnings that 
t he stock dividends represent . 
An implica t ion su.;ges t ed by the s t atistical analysis is that in-
vestors and security analysts should be cautious of giving the level of 
the payout ratio more t'1an a nominal weight l11hen evaluating common stocks 
for investment. The data in this study o not indicate that low payout 
ratios per se influence corporate growt1 . l·!hile the lou-payout stocks 
exhibit a tendency to appreciate at a faster rate than the high-payout 
stocks, the data is insufficient to base predictions of future growth or 
market price appreciation on the payout ratio alone . It would seem that 
the quality of management , the sro,·lth potential of the industry, ~nc: the 
rate of profit on additional investment are of greater iraportance than the 
mere retention of earnings . 
1rnile lou payouts may be characteristic of many t.ro~lth stocks, 
there is no evidence in t~is study that a low payout ratio is necessary 
for corporate grouth or market price appreciation. This uould seem to 
ir.tply that in mnny case~ superior r.;rmvth and a liberal dividenC: payout can 
be achieved at t~e same time . To illustrate , the A~crican Home Products 
Company, with a payout ratio of 71% for the period, enjoyed an increase 
in earnings of 298% and an increase in market price of over :.;ix times . 
Furthermore, the National Lead Colilpany paid out 70',. of its earnings during 
the period, \rl1ile achieving an increase in earnings of 20J% and an in-
crease in market price of over e:i.ght and one half tines . The r,1ean in-
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crease of the earnings of the groHth stock sample durin£; this perioo \vas 
ll3 . o% and the mean increase in market price \·las 426 . u% . 
out of the growth stocks vms 5L~%. 
T~1e mean pay-
Of course it may be that companies with superior grmvtn poten-
tial and liberal dividend policies \·Jill sell at abnor;-nally high price -
earnings ratios, so that a low yield will result even t1ough the payout 
ratio is high . Nevertheless , the American Home Products Company sold at 
13.5 times earnings in 1954 \ilien the mean price -earnings ratio for the 
growth s t ock group ~vas 17. 7 times . Tnerefore it seems that there are 
cases \vhere it is possible for investors to obtain both a liberal dividend 
return and capital appreciation. 
A possible implication of the management survey is that the res -
pondents are rather conservative in their attitudes toward dividends . 
Apparently managements realize t he desirability of stating dividend policies 
to stockholders , but appear reluctant to do so . Surely such statement::> 
would place considerable pressure on management to adhere to t i1e stated 
policy. Perl.1aps they fear that t hey Hould not ahmys be able to follow 
the policies to Hhich they \vould thereby be committed. Tnis vlOuld not 
seem to relieve them of their responsibility however . Should conditions 
change, management could justifiably alter its policies and provide stock -
holders uith an exp l anation for the change . 
There is evidence that the retention of earnings docs not explain 
6 rowth, but is merely a means of financing expansion. On the other hand, 
external financing plays a minor role in determining the diviJend policies 
of these companies . This seems to imply that in many case::> companies 
co·1ld pay more liberal dividends while financing expansion uith external 
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sources of funds . Stockholders then would receive a liberal dividend 
return in conjunction \vith grmvth of their equity . Such pract~ue would 
seem to benefit stockholder s providing the profit rate on additional in-
vestment is sufficient to offset t he costs of additional financing . If 
not, there might be a strong case agains t expansion a nyway . It is 
obvious, hm1evcr , that conditions vary betHeen companies and indus tries, 
and certainly many cyclical companies would find difficulty in follm·ling 
such practice . 
The author regrets that he Has unable to conduct interviei.vS 
t..rith corporate executives in order to supplement the ques tionnaire . 
This type of survey possibly would indicate more clearly tne true feelings 
of the executives . Furthermor e , the subject could have been covered in 
more detail and greater a ccuracy in response could have been obtained . 
For example , the question regarding stockholder voUng on div ;_dend policy 
could have beer: clarified since its full meaning ma:y have been vague to 
the respondents . 
As a result of this study, it seems evident tllat certa.in questions 
would merit further research. For exanple , do the dividend yields or 
original investment in grmvt.l stacks eventually pass t be dividend yield 
on income stocks? If so , hoH long does i t take? mlat lengtt1 of time 
is required, generally, for the combined return of dividends and market 
price appreciation from grmvth stock investments to surpass the return o'1 
investments for income and stabilit)? 
Of fur ther interest v70uld be a study of ttle relative merit s of 
financinG th~ ~xpansion of a corporation throu"'tl ear.linf;S retention an<l 
external source::.; of funds . Al t,lCugh t.1.erc iJ probahl::, no policy :i.n t11is 
r ' \.JL~ • 
area that is suitable to all companies , it is pos;;;ible that a r.1o.:-e eciuit -
able bal ance between ear nings r etent i on and ex t e r nal financing cot l d be 
obtained for atockrtolders in many cases . 
At any rat e , due to ti1e broadening base of O\mersh.ip in the 
United 3tates, it uould seem t:1at corporations r.1u:.>t expect s ,lJ.I1 investors 
and institutional investorG to Jupply their capital needs in t'tc future . 
Ti1erefore it uould :.>ecm desirable for corporationJ to consider the possi -
bility of subordinating t.1e pr"ctice of rctainin~ earnings for c::paas::.on 
to t.1e needc; of t~1e stocknolC:.ers for an adequate dividend return . Ex -
tcrnal sources of funds might be u s ed to greater advm.tage to fin~~ce t1e 
capital need~ of the business . Corporations also :.;hould ta:~e ....,rc..ater 
pains to inform stocknoldcrs and potential investors of their c.!:~viciend 
policie.;, and .J.wuld adhere to these policies to tae bc.:>t of t .. e:·.r abili-
ties . 
On the other hand, neH and rapidly "'ro<ving cor.1panies t:1at reciuire 
large amount~ of capit1l, would be ~ustificd in retaining the na:or share 
of earnings provided such a policy uere made public. ~uch corporations 
should appeal to \vealthy investors rather thaa small investor.:; a::; the 
former are able to afford the risks of supplyinc venture capital and woJld 
benefi t from t'i1e tax advant ages of investing for capit.:1l t.;ai.:1J. 
APPEHDIX 
Table VI. Payout Ratios of T\venty-Five 
Gro\Jth Stocks 
19L;9 -19.:58 
Company 
Abbott Laboratories 
Aluminum COiilpan) of :,.nerica 
Arner ada Petroleu.n Corporation 
.'-'.J.aerican Hone Products Corporation 
E. I. du Pont de Ne·nour;:; & Company 
General Zlectric C01:1p1.n) 
Gulf Oi l Corporation 
Hcrculc3 Pouder Company 
Interna tional Paper Company 
Kiu1berly - Clark Corporation 
Masonite Corp ration 
Minneapolis - Honey>vell Re.;ul ator Company 
Hinnesota llinin::, & Nanufactur ing Company 
G. C . • lurp.l~ Company 
National Lead Company 
Outboard J.larine Corporation 
Chas. Pfizer & Cmapany, Inc . 
Sears , Roebuck and Company 
Scott Paper Company 
Standard Oil Company (Ne>v Jersey) 
Tne St 1.nciard Oil Company (Onio) 
Sunbea1n Corp or at ion 
Union Carbide Corporation 
U.3 . Plywood Corporation 
l~s tinghouse Electric Corporation 
3ource : 'Iood\' 1 s Indus trial Hanual s 
Per Cent 
Payout 
72 
_)..) 
" ..Jv 
71 
9 
65 
31 
v2 
50 
·. 7 
3-. 
71 
.:'.-2 
51 
u5 
Table VII . Payout Ratios of ~lenty-live 
Income ;:)tacks 
1949 -1958 
Co1.1pany 
American Cyanamid Company 
American Smelting 'lnd Refining Company 
Bethlehem Jteel Co:upany 
Bond 3torcs 
Bor3 -Warner Corporation 
The Celotex Corporation 
Colgate - Palmolive Co •• 1pa'"1y 
Cont1aertal Can Comp'lny, Inc . 
Deer e & Cm1pany 
Glidden Cor:1pany 
I nland .:>teel 
Kennecott Copper Corporation 
3 . ..> . Krese,e Co1apany 
R. H. 1acy & Co:npan:y, I nc . 
llont~Oiaery .. ard & Comp'lny , Inc . 
Nat.:.onal Ac~1e Conpany 
National Jteel Corporation 
Pepsi - Cola Company 
Phelps Dodge Corporation 
Phi l ip !orris , Inc . 
Phillip;.; Petroleu•n Cor.1pany 
3outil Puerto Rico .>ugar Co1npany 
Jtandard Oi 1 Company of CaL.fornia 
United Jtates )teel Corporation 
F . ~-J . Fooluore1 Company 
Jource: 1oody ' s Industrial Manuals 
Per Cent 
Pa1 o..1t 
32 
00 
4.J 
05 
61 
.JO 
4t5 
:.>1 
~~s 
60 
49 
0~ 
L9 
67 
so 
6J 
_.4 
.;7 
u 
t:JO 
52 
88 
L; ':'.; 
51 
7'-i 
Table VIII. Payout Ratiou o f ~venty -Five 
Cyclical Stock::; 
194-9 - 1958 
Company 
Allegheny Ludlum 3teel Corporation 
Allis -Cnalaers Hanufacturing Company 
Anchor Hocking Glass Corporation 
Armco Steel Corporation 
Ar.ns tron0 Cork Company 
Babcock & · 'ilcox Company 
Boeing Airplane Company 
Budd Company 
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company 
Corning Glass Horks 
General Cable Corporation 
The B. F. Goodrich Company 
Ingersoll-Rand Company 
International Harvester Company 
Le'1igL1 Portland Cement Company 
Link-Belt Company 
Na"tional Gypsum 
Penn -Dixie Cement Corporation 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company 
Republic Steel Corporation 
Reynolds Metals Company 
United Aircraft Corporation 
U. 3. Pipe & Foundry Company 
U. S. Rubber Company 
Ynle & Toune Hanufacturing Company 
Source : Moody ' s Industt ial Manuals 
Per Cent 
Payout 
L~ 7 
53 
L;.S 
&7 . 
Table IX . Payout Ratios of Ten 
Company 
Allll:Jinum Co.npan:y of America 
American Cyananid 
Low-Payout 3tocks 
191:9 -19 58 
.3oeing \irplane co,npany 
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company 
The B. F. Goodrich Conpany 
Gulf Oil Corporation 
Lehigh Portland Cement Company 
Na;;onite Cor poration 
Reynolds Hete.ls Company 
Sunbeam Corporation 
Source : Hoody ' s I nduGtrial Hanuals 
Table X. Payout Ratios of Ten 
High-Payout Jtocks 
1949 - 19)<-
Company 
Abbott Laboratories 
American Home Product::> Corporation 
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Conpany 
General Electric Compan:y 
Ingersoll -Rand Comp:;,ny 
Kennecott Copper Corporation 
National Lead Co;np·my 
Soutt1 Puerto Rico Jugar Company 
Union Carbide Corporation 
F.~ . Hooh10rtt1 Company 
Source : doody's Indu..;t r ial danuals 
Per Cent 
Payout 
3.::) 
::,z 
33 
.J7 
'..;7 
~l 
3L 
37 
1 
) 
JJ 
Per Cent 
Payoat 
72 
71 
39 
L -·' 
73 
88 
70 
88 
71 
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Table AI . Cop) of ~uestionnaire 
Used in the Survey 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Do you believe it is an obligation of nanagcment 
to st~te clearly to stockholders its dividend 
policy? 
Do you believe t~at the priJary responsibility of 
nanage'llent is to the stock 10lders r ather tnan 
to the corporation as a separate entity in 
itself? 
\:ould you approve of allmving common stocl-.~'lolders 
to vote on matters of ndividend policy? 
YE3 
YES 
YE3 
4 . Please rank in order of importance the follmving 
factors taat Tiigat affect the dividend policy 
of your company. (1 for most important, 2 for 
next in i'nportance, etc .) 
5 . 
6 . 
a ) cash position and uorking capital 
requirements a ) 
b) expans ion plans or ot1er projects 
requiring large capital expenditures b ) 
c) current net earnings c) 
d) stability or l a ck of stability of earnings 
d) 
c) stockholders' preferences for dividends or 
reinvestment of earnings c) 
f ) use or non-use of external financin0 f ) 
Doe s maintenance of the dividend play a major part 
in the financial planning of your coupany? 
Do you believe that stock dividends are a satisfactory 
substitute for cash dividends over an ext ended 
YES 
period of t ime? 'lES 
113 . 
NO 
NO 
KO 
NO 
NO 
Any connnents that you might \vish to add bclo-v1 \-lQI_lld be appreciated . 
Tnble XII. Results of Questionnaire 
Questions 1 -3, 5, and 6 
Question 
Do you believe 
it is an obliga-
tion of nanage -
raent to state 
clearly to stock -
nolders its 
dividend poli.cy? 
no you believe 
that t he primary 
r esponsibility of 
management is to 
the stockholders 
r ather than to the 
corporation as a 
separate entity i n 
itcelf? 
ould you approve 
of al lm"ing conunon 
stockholders to 
vote on natters of 
dividend policy? 
Does maintenance 
of tne dividend 
play a major par t 
in the financial 
pl anning of your 
company? 
Do you believe 
that stock dividends 
arc a satisfactory 
substitute for cash 
dividends over an 
extended period of 
time? 
Grmvth 
3tocks 
Yes No 
11 6 
10 5 
0 16 
11 5 
0 13 
I ncome 
Stocks 
Ye::> No 
21 3 
20 1 
0 24 
22 4 
1 23 
Cyclical 
3toc'.<:> 
Yes No 
13 
15 7 
0 26 
20 
1 21 
114. 
Tot.::Jl 
Yes No 
50 17 
13 
0 66 
53 13 
2 57 
llS . 
Table XIII. Relative Ir.1portance of Factors 
Affecting Dividend Policies 
Factor Growth Incor.te Cycl ical 
Stocks Stocks Stocks Total v ... Heig~1t Ranic 
Cash position 1. 10 ll 10 31 (, 1&6 
and \vorking 2. 2 8 10 20 s 100 
capital 3 . 2 , 0 2 10 '~ l.O 
re(1Uiremcnts . Lf . 2 0 1 ' 3 9 ..) 
.) , 0 0 2 2 2 Lf 
6 . 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Total Rank 339 
Expansion 1. t.~ 1:. 4 12 6 72 
plans or 2 . 3 lf ) 12 ~ 60 -' 
other pro - ., L;. 6 11 21 ., t-4 ..) , .,. 
jects req•1ir - ft. 5 10 '• 19 " -'7 -' 
ing large 5 . 0 0 1 1 2 2 
capital expen- 1, , 0 0 0 0 0 0 
di t ..1r es . Total Rank 275 
Current 1. 8 10 10 2L 6 168 
Net 2. ' L!. 7 7 lG 5 90 
Ear nings J . 2 5 5 12 L;. l~-~ L, . 0 3 2 5 ' 15 .) 
5 . 1 0 1 2 2 l: 
G. 2 0 0 2 1 2 
Total Rank '.:,27 
Stability 1. 2 2 5 9 ( 54" 
or lack of 2. 5 7 2 llf s 70 
stability 5 u 
., 14 i:. .)(.) ..) , .) 
of earn- 3 6 13 22 3 66 
ings . .) , 1 3 1 ) 2 10 
'-' · 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Total Rank 256 
Jtockholders' 1. 2 0 1 ') J 
'"'' 
l G 
prefer:en ces 2. 0 1 2 3 5 15 
for dividends 3 . 1 0 2 3 !: 12 
or reinvest - 4. 2 3 0 5 3 15 
nent of earn- ..) , 5 l; 4 l.J 2 26 
ings . 6 . 5 13 lL• 32 1 32 
Total Rank 113 
Use or 1. 1 0 1 2 6 12 
non-use of 2. 1 0 0 1 5 5 
extern1l 3 . 2 1 0 :> l:. 12 
fin~ncing . 4 . 3 1 2 6 
., l C .) 
5 . 6 14 12 32 2 64 
6. 3 6 n 17 1 17 
Total R2.nk 12 l 
11 . 
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